SCI ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY MANUAL ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 8 ENCLOSURE 2 PERSONNEL SECURITY 1. GENERAL. T he protection of SCI is directly related to the effectiveness of the personnel security program. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 704 (Reference (f)) establishes the personnel security standards for the Intelligence Community (IC). An interlocking and mutually supporting series of program elements (e.g., need to know, investigation, binding contractual obligations on those granted access, security education and awareness, individual responsibility, and continuing evaluation) provide reasonable assurances against compromise of SCI by those authorized access to it. 2. APPROVAL AUTHORITY a. A ccess eligibility to SCI is granted by a determination authority as delegated by the appropriate Head of an Intelligence Community Element (HICE) having cognizance of the individuals involved. Within the DoD, access eligibility is reciprocal except for interim personnel security clearances. The central adjudication facilities (CAFs) of the following components are authorized to grant, deny, or revoke SCI access eligibility in accordance with Reference (f). (1) The Department of the Army. (2) The Department of the Navy. (3) The Department of the Air Force. (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (5) The National Security Agency. (6) The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. b. HICEs may delegate authority to the senior intelligence official (SIO) to approve the need to know for Special Intelligence (SI)), TALENT KEYHOLE (TK) GAMMA, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Control System (hereafter referred to collectively as SCI) accesses for personnel under their security cognizance, including contractors, consultants, members of the Reserve Component, Government departments or agencies involved in DoD activities , and members of boards and other applicable activities. SIO approval authority shall not be further delegated. (1) D irector, DIA, as a HICE, delegates to the SIOs of the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities under DIA security cognizance, the authority to approve the need to know for SCI accesses, including special purpose accesses, for personnel

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 9 under their respective security cognizance, including contractors, members of the Reserve Component, personnel from non-National Intelligence Board (NIB) member Government departments or agencies involved in DoD activities, and members of boards and other applicable activities. (2) HICEs and SIOs are responsible for stringent application of SCI security policy and procedures and the need to know principle. They are responsible for ensuring that only those personnel with a validated operational requirement for SCI access are nominated for SCI to preclude unnecessary investigations and adjudications with their attendant cost. c. The Director of National Intelligence ( DNI) (through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Security) grants SCI access for individuals in non-NIB member Government departments or agencies. d. S ection 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Reference (g)) requires that security clearance background investigations and SCI determinations be accepted by all government departments or agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Pursuant to Executive Order 13467 (Reference (h)), the DNI also serves as the Security Executive Agent with certain responsibilities over personnel security processes across the federal government, to include ensuring reciprocal recognition of eligibility for SCI access. In June 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assigned the responsibility to arbitrate and resolve case-specific disputes among departments or agencies involving the reciprocity of security clearances and access to SCI to the DNI. Pursuant to Reference (g), DoD Components may not establish additional investigative or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the conduct of a polygraph examination where appropriate) that exceed security requirements established by executive order without the approval of the DNI and the Director, OMB. (1) I CD 704 (Reference (f)) requires IC elements and the CAFs to accept all "in scope" personnel security investigations and access determinations that are void of conditions, deviations or waivers. Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 704.4 (Reference (i)) defines "in scope" investigations as those that are less than seven years old. As a matter of DoD policy, all DoD Components shall follow References (f), (i), ICD 709 (Reference (j)), ICPG 704.1 (Reference (k)), and ICPG 704.2 (Reference (l)). Reference (i) also requires that any denial of reciprocity for an eligibility determination that is “in scope” and without exceptions shall be reported to the DNI. DoD Components shall make such reports through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. (2) Reference (k) establishes the personnel security investigative standards and procedures for SCI access. Under reference (k), reinvestigations of personnel eligible for reciprocity are required if their last personnel security investigation was completed more than 5 years ago or if they had a break in service or government employment for more than 24 months. To preserve reciprocity, the reinvestigation must be in progress within 7 years from the completion of previous investigation.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 10 ( 3) Access eligibility determinations made on the basis of an exception to Reference (l) personnel security standards or investigation standards are subject to review and acceptance by the gaining HICE. The HICE or designee making eligibility determinations based on an exception as specified in paragraph F of Reference (f) shall ensure that the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) is updated. 3. I C D 704 ELIGIBILITY . References (k) and (l) mandate personnel security standards for investigation and adjudication eligibility for access to SCI. A single scope background investigation (SSBI) or periodic reinvestigation (PR) that is current or “in scope” will serve as the basis for granting access approval. a. Only individuals who shall have more than 1 year of job or position tenure after SCI indoctrination should be nominated. b. N ominees must not have had a break greater than 24 months in Military Service or Federal civilian employment, or in access to classified information pursuant to the National Industrial Security Program (DoD 5220.22-M and Supplement 1 to DoD 5220.22-M (References (m) and (n))). c. If individuals have a current SSBI or PR but are not SCI-indoctrinated, they must undergo a personal screening interview covering the period since the completion of the last investigation to assure that they continue to meet the standards of Reference (f). The SCI screening interview shall be conducted by the cognizant SSO or designated security official (See Appendix 1 to this enclosure for interview format). If adverse information is disclosed, the appropriate CAF shall be expeditiously notified. d . In exceptional cases, the HICE or designee may determine that it is in the national interest to authorize temporary access to SCI prior to completion of the required investigation (See paragraph 8.a. of this enclosure). Contractor companies must have a final and current facility clearance (FCL) before contractor personnel can be granted temporary access to SCI. Valid FCLs are reciprocal and facility reviews will not be repeated for multiple contracts IAW DoD 5220.22-M. e. Requests for investigation shall be submitted to the Office of Personnel Management in accordance with current guidance from the investigation provider. The appropriate CAF shall adjudicate all SSBIs and PRs. f. JPAS is the DoD personnel security system of record and shall be used to record SCI eligibility determinations and indoctrination authority. SCI indoctrinations in JPAS not accompanied by an owning SCI Security Management Office (SMO) will not be considered valid. SCI SMO ownership indicates continued and valid need to know.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 11 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR SCI ACCESS a. T he HICE or designees may grant SCI access for Federal civilian employees and U.S. military personnel after favorable accomplishment of each of the following: (1) P re-nomination interview prior to indoctrination to SCI. (2) Validation of the individual’s need to know. (3) Favorable determination of the individual’s eligibility as detailed in Reference (f). (4) Completion of pre-nomination interview prior to SCI indoctrination. Guidelines for pre-nomination interviews are included in Appendix 1 to this Enclosure. (5) Signing of a N on-Disclosure Statement (NdS) by the individual. (6) Completion of an SCI security indoctrination of the individual. b. T he HICE or designees may grant SCI access to U.S. contractor employees under the following conditions. (1) A DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification Specification,” certifies that the contract for which the work shall be performed requires SCI access. (2) The need to know for SCI access is determined and approved by the SIO where the work shall be performed. (3) The appropriate U.S. Government C ontracting Officer’s Representative (COR) endorses the requirement. (4) The requirements in paragraphs 4.a.(3) through 4.a.(6) of this enclosure are successfully completed. 5. THE NEED TO KNOW PRINCIPLE. The primary security principle in safeguarding SCI is access only by those persons with an appropriate clearance, access approval, clearly identified need to know, and appropriate indoctrination. Even when approved for a specific access, the holder is expected to practice need to know in acquiring or disseminating information about the program(s) or project(s) involved. a. I ntrinsic to this discipline is acquiring or disseminating only that information essential to effectively carrying out the assignment. No person shall be deemed to have a need to know solely by virtue of rank, title, or position.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 12 b. When a previously established need to know no longer exists due to reorganization, r eassignment, change in duties, or any other reason, the SCI access approval affected by this change shall be cancelled and the individual shall be debriefed. 6. S C I ACCESS MANAGEMENT a . JPAS shall be the source of individual and collective personnel security data that enables effective SCI access management. The HICEs shall approve individuals for SCI access based on mission requirements and the individual’s need to know. The HICE or designee shall manage the granting of SCI accesses in a manner that shall: (1) Record all SCI indoctrinations and debriefings in JPAS. (2) Identify the number of accesses granted, denied, revoked, and suspended. (3) Identify an individual’s SCI eligibility date, SSBI date, SSBI-PR date, SCI NdS date, accesses, and exception(s). b. T he HICE shall issue administrative procedures for granting SCI accesses to Government and contractor personnel in accordance with Reference (f). c. When JPAS is unavailable, the IC’s security clearance repository “Scattered Castles” is the alternative system for verifying clearances and SCI accesses. 7. SCI INDOCTRINATION. Indoctrination is the instruction provided to an individual prior to his or her receiving access to an SCI system or program. The instructions convey the unique nature, unusual sensitivity, and special security safeguards and practices for SCI handling, particularly the necessity to protect sensitive sources and methods. SCI indoctrination includes the signing of an NdS, a briefing on the authorized SCI access, and instructions on the individual’s responsibilities. a. NdS. As a condition of access to SCI, individuals must sign a DNI-authorized NdS that includes a provision for prepublication review (DD Form 1847-1, “Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Statement”). The NdS establishes explicit obligations on both the Government and the individual for the protection of SCI. An NdS is binding for life and cannot be revoked or waived. Failure to sign an NdS shall result in denial of SCI access. b. Classification. T he NdS is unclassified; however, in certain cases, the fact that a particular person signed an NdS and that the position requires SCI access establishes a relationship that may be classified. The responsible SCI security officer shall ensure that a completed NdS is classified, if required by a program classification guide and record it in the appropriate secure system of record.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 13 c. N dS Completion Procedures. The SCI security officer shall determine if an individual has previously signed an NdS and so verify in JPAS. If verified, no further action is required. If the SCI security officer cannot determine that an individual has signed an NdS, the individual shall sign an NdS prior to receiving access. There is no prohibition against an individual having more than one signed NdS. The security official shall take the following actions in sequence: (1) Provide the individual with a briefing on the general nature and procedures for protecting the SCI to which he or she shall be exposed and explain the purpose of the NdS. (2) Provide the individual the opportunity to read the applicable portions of Executive Order (EO) 13526 (Reference (o)) and statutes cited in the NdS. Security officers should use a copy of Standard Form 312 to respond to questions. If questions arise that cannot be answered, the NdS shall not be completed until questions are resolved by the appropriate HICE or designee. (3) Provide the individual an opportunity to express any reservations concerning the execution of the NdS or objection to having SCI access. If an individual declines to sign an NdS as written, he or she shall not be indoctrinated or granted SCI access. (a) The NdS shall not be altered by the individual requested to sign it. Because signing the NdS is voluntary, the person administering the NdS must not apply any duress. (b) Supporting SCI security officers shall coordinate with appropriate offices to ensure that personnel are aware that a position may require the completion of the NdS. (c) The appropriate HICE or designee must be advised as soon as possible if an individual refuses to sign an NdS. (4) I nstruct the individual to complete the form in ink using his or her signature. All appropriate blanks on the NdS form must be completed legibly (printed or typed). (5) Instruct the witness to sign the NdS in ink using his or her payroll signature. Signing the NdS shall be witnessed and accepted for the Government by a military member or a Federal employee. A contractor may not accept the NdS. (6) Annotate JPAS with the date that the NdS was signed and the HICE to whom the NdS was sent for retention. Organizations administering the NdS may keep a copy if desired and may provide a copy to the individual at the time of completion. d. NdS Retention. The cognizant HICE or head of the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Military Services is responsible for retaining in a retrievable manner the original NdS for at least 70 years or until death of the individual. This includes contractor NdSs. e. I ndoctrination for Access (1) After the NdS has been signed and accepted, the individual s hall be fully indoctrinated on the aspects of the SCI compartment to which he or she is authorized access.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 14 (a) Special security officers (SSOs) and authorized contractor special security officers (CSSOs) shall use any briefing video approved by the DIA Counterintelligence and Security Office (DAC) as the core indoctrination for access to SI/TK compartments. (b) SCI indoctrination shall describe the specific aspects of the control system requiring protection and advise the recipient of proper channels for reporting matters of security significance, requesting security advice, and determining whether others are authorized access to the control system for which the recipient is approved. (c) SSOs shall instruct the individual about prepublication review prior to public release and about outside activities. (See section 15 of this enclosure for additional guidance.) (2) A local SCI security orientation briefing will also be presented and address local security conditions and the command’s SCI policy. (3) Each time an individual is indoctrinated for SCI access, he or she shall complete a DD Form 1847-1, “Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Statement.” (a) The servicing SSO shall use a DAC approved video as the core indoctrination for access to SI/TK compartments. (b) The servicing SSO shall promptly update JPAS to reflect the control systems for the indoctrinated individual. f. Post-Indoctrination Change in Status. The local SCI security official or SSO shall conduct the following (and document such actions) in support of a notification of intent to marry or cohabit with a foreign national: (1) A local agency check on the intended spouse or cohabitant (to the extent possible dependent on the local situation). (2) A risk assessment that weighs the value afforded the U.S. national security by the individual’s continued SCI access eligibility against the risk posed by the intimate relationship with the foreign national. (3) Completion of appropriate s ingle agency checks via the Office of Personnel Management on the foreign national intended spouse or cohabitant and immediate foreign family members. (4) Written counseling of the indoctrinated person regarding the automatic reevaluation of their SCI eligibility and the potential adverse effects of this action on their continuing SCI eligibility.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 15 8. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. Requests for access in special circumstances, including national emergency situations and hostilities, must be based on the urgent need of an organization to prevent failure or serious impairment of missions or operations that are in the best interest of the national security. a. Temporary/Interim Eligibility for Access to SCI. The HICE or designee may determine that it is in the national interest to authorize temporary access to SCI before completion of the required investigation (1) The nominating SCI security office shall: (a) Review the pending SF 86 for a favorable determination. (b) Make the appropriate local records checks that are immediately possible and conduct a pre-nomination personal security interview of the individual wherever possible and practicable. Local records check should include, at a minimum, a review of criminal records in the jurisdiction where individual lives, review of military police records (if applicable), and local security records. If feasible, a trained security or counterintelligence person should conduct the personal interview. (c) Document the manner in which the individual’s access shall be strictly controlled while the full investigation and a final evaluation are completed. (d) Transmit requests for temporary or interim eligibility determination to the appropriate DoD CAF using JPAS. (2) D oD CAFs shall process requests for temporary SCI eligibility in accordance with (Reference (h)). ( 3) Temporary eligibility for access to SCI is valid only at the organization granting it and at other agencies that expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding of its investigative basis. ( 4) During a national emergency or hostilities, HICEs or their designees may authorize immediate access to SCI for any non-indoctrinated U.S. citizen if the tactical situation and national security require such urgent and immediate access. Such access shall be terminated when the tactical situation allows. As soon as practical, the supporting SSO shall: (a) Document this decision. (b) Have the individual execute a nondisclosure agreement (Standard Form 312) or NdS (DD Form 1847-1). (c) I nitiate a request for interim or temporary SCI access.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 16 b. Access by Former Senior DoD Officials. DoD Components may request that retired general or flag officers and Senior Executive Service (SES) civilians participate in DoD- sponsored events when their specific expertise is vital. The HICE may grant access under the condition that the SCI or materials involved are not removed from the confines of a Government installation or other areas approved for SCI. SCI disclosed should not create a conflict of interest for the individuals or give them or their employer (present or potential) a competitive advantage. (1) A general or flag officer or SES civilian in the DoD Component shall sponsor the request for SCI eligibility and access. (2) The individual must meet Reference (f ) eligibility standards for SCI access. (3) The request shall provide a justification of need to know. (4) The requester shall forward all requests to the appropriate HICE or designee no later than 10 working days before access is required. Periods of access shall be valid no longer than 1 year. c. Access by Retired U.S. Government Employees. U pon retirement or separation from the Federal Government, all collateral clearances and SCI accesses shall be terminated and the individual shall be debriefed. On a case-by-case basis, a retired U.S. Government employee functioning as a non-paid consultant may be granted SCI access not to exceed 1 year under the following conditions: (1) The individual meets SCI eligibility standards as determined by the sponsoring HICE or designee. (2) The sponsoring HICE or designee validates the requirement and gives personal approval for SCI access. d. Special Purpose Access (SPA). Individuals, for example Reserve Component personnel, students, or persons participating in U.S. military exercises, occasionally require access to SCI to perform a specific task. The HICE or designee may grant access not to exceed 180 days. (1) The SPA shall be approved based on the criticality of the need to know and a favorable Reference (f) eligibility determination from the appropriate CAF as entered in the DoD personnel security clearance system of record. (2) Upon approval, the individual shall be given an indoctrination briefing which includes the basic information to protect SCI. The individual shall sign an NdS and be indoctrinated for the appropriate SCI access. (3) Records of indoctrination for SPA shall include specific date of automatic debrief from SCI access. Extensions must be requested and approved before the automatic debrief date. e. Details and Temporary Duty

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 17 (1) When an individual from the DoD is detailed to a position in the Executive Office of the President or a board or activity not under the security cognizance of the Department, the authority determining the need to know is responsible for briefing and debriefing the individual and shall obtain concurrence from the parent DoD Component prior to granting access. (2) T he indoctrination of individuals on temporary duty assignment requiring access to SCI is primarily the responsibility of the parent department or agency. However, the parent department or agency may ask the temporary duty station to provide indoctrination assistance. Whenever practicable, indoctrination assistance requests should be processed via JPAS. (3) D oD Components providing indoctrination assistance should input the indoctrination data in the individual’s JPAS record and forward the SCI indoctrination paperwork to the individual’s home-station SSO. f. Military Reserve Personnel and National Guard. The Military Services are responsible for certifying SCI access eligibility of their assigned reservists and National Guard personnel (Army and Air Force). The SSBI and SCI access eligibility for reserve and National Guard personnel are acceptable if the investigation is current or “in scope” and an SCI screening interview indicates no major change in personal status that would affect their access eligibility. Reserve and National Guard personnel who no longer meet these requirements must be processed in accordance with this enclosure. Reserve and National Guard personnel may be immediately re- indoctrinated for SCI access upon arrival under the following conditions: (1) T hey possess a current SSBI or PR. (2) They are currently assigned in either a direct support unit manning position, an individual mobilization augmentee (IMA), or a mobilization designee (MOBDES) position on a recurring basis to the command. (3) They are currently SCI eligible authorized by the appropriate Service CAF. (4) Reservists shall be afforded access only to the level of SCI required to successfully perform the reserve tour as defined by the SPA justification. They shall not be granted SCI access for convenience. (5) Reservists who require SCI access for their 2 -week duty tours, but whose weekend duties do not require SCI access, should be provided an SPA for the 2-week tour. SCI access authorized to reservists in connection with their reserve duties may not be used in connection with civilian or contractor employment. (6) The appropriate joint agency shall indoctrinate and debrief reservists assigned to joint service positions.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 18 (7) Reservists and National Guardsmen assigned to IMA or to MOBDES positions and who require SCI access shall be determined SCI eligible, indoctrinated to required accesses, and debriefed at termination of assignment. (8) Reservists who are also SCI -indoctrinated contractors shall receive a conflict of interest education briefing as part of their initial indoctrination by the local SCI security official and shall sign a conflict of interest acknowledgment. (See Appendix 2 to this enclosure for the briefing.) g. Contract o r Access. U.S. contractors and supporting U.S. Government SSOs may request and use DoD employee certifications held by another DoD agency or department, provided that the U.S. Government contractor's SCI need to know has been established and approved by the appropriate HICE. h. Consultant Access. Consultants are authorized SCI access to information specifically identified in the statement of work or consultant agreement. i. Proximity Access. P roximity access is no longer authorized in accordance with DNI ICPM 2006-700-8 (Reference (p)). j. I ntergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Access . IPA employees are individuals who are detailed or appointed to temporary positions within the Federal Government. Individuals are sometimes recruited from outside the Federal Government and designated as IPAs on temporary assignments in order to gain benefit of their unique, special skills. Procedures and requirements for SCI eligibility and indoctrination of Federal Government employees described in this Volume apply to IPAs. IPAs shall be processed as civilians and meet all investigative and adjudicative requirements prior to being provided SCI access. 9. SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF SCI ACCESS. When the need to know for SCI has ceased or an individual’s access to SCI is suspended or revoked, the individual shall be denied further access to SCI. The SSO (or CSSO, if appropriate) is responsible for accomplishing and reporting the debrief action in JPAS and for canceling all current visitor certifications pertaining to the debriefed individual. Upon notification from the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) that an individual’s SCI accesses have been suspended or revoked, the SSO or CSSO shall immediately cancel all certifications and notify the CSA that such action was completed. a. Debriefings. As a minimum, debriefings shall include: (1) Reading the appropriate sections of the appendix to title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (q), hereafter referred to as the “Classified Information Procedures Act” or “CIPA”) and section 783 of title 50, U.S.C. (Reference (r)), thereby reminding the individual of the intent and criminal sanctions of these laws relative to espionage and unauthorized disclosure. ( 2) Reading a statement emphasizing the req uirement for continued protection of SCI and the responsibilities incurred by the NdS. Acknowledgment of the continuing obligation of

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 19 the individual under the prepublication and other provisions of the NdS never to divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, spoken word, conduct or otherwise, to any unauthorized persons any SCI without the written consent of appropriate department or agency officials. (3) Reading an acknowledgment that the individual shall report without delay to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the department or agency, any attempt by an unauthorized person to solicit national security information. (4) Reminding the individual of the risks associated with foreign travel reporting requirements as applicable. ( 5) Signing a DD Form 1848, “Sensitive Compartmented Information Debriefing Memorandum.” The DD Form 1848 is unclassified when using the DNI approved digraphs or trigraphs. ( 6) Updating the clearance system of record with the debrief status by the cognizant SSO. b. Suspension of SCI Access . DoD HICEs shall maintain active programs to monitor the continued security eligibility of SCI-cleared personnel. SSOs should maintain effective liaison with supervisory personnel, to identify as early as possible potential security problems involving SCI-indoctrinated personnel. (1) When information of obvious security concern develops: ( a) The appropriate commander or official shall immediately determine if it is in the interest of national security to retain a person in-status, or to take interim action to locally suspend access to SCI pending final resolution of the issue. (b) The SCI security officer shall expeditiously remove SCI access from JPAS and work with the commander or official to determine how the issue may affect the individual’s continued eligibility for SCI under the OMB Adjudicative Guidelines contained in Reference (i) and whether the issue requires action by the cognizant CAF. (See Figure 1 for format.) (2) L ocal SCI access suspension is a temporary measure designed to safeguard sensitive classified information or facilities while the issue of concern is investigated. If the commander or official decides the issue warrants reporting to the cognizant CAF, the SCI security officer will use JPAS. (a) The JPAS incident report will include the date of the decision as the formal suspension date. The commander, HICE, or adjudicative authority must notify the individual, in writing, of the formal suspension of SCI access and of the reason for such action. (b) Follow-up reporting will continue until the individual’s commander or official has made a final recommendation to the CAF.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 20 (c) Once submitted, only the cognizant CAF can make a final determination regarding the individual’s continued SCI eligibility. Figure 1 provides a template for suspension report to be provided to CAFs. (3) Individuals who have had their SCI access suspended, or have received a final denial or revocation of security clearance, may not enter a SCIF except with HICE or designee approval. Figure 1. SCI Access Suspension Report Format c. I ncident Reports. When an individual is debriefed from all SCI access for cause, the SSO shall submit an Incident Report via JPAS to the supporting CAF. The report shall specify reason for report, accesses held, indoctrination and debriefing dates, a justification for the debriefing, and any other pertinent information (see Figure 2). Individuals debriefed for cause shall only be re-indoctrinated following favorable adjudication by the cognizant CAF. SUBJ: SUSPENSION OF SCI ACCESSES 1 . NAME, RANK, SERVICE, SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER (SSAN) 2 . STATEMENT THAT THE COMMANDER (SPECIFY UNIT/BASE) HAS SUSPENDED SCI ACCESS. 3 . REASON FOR SUSPENSION: 4 . STATEMENT WHETHER AN INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED AND, IF SO, WHEN AND BY WHOM. 5 . STATEMENT OF ACTION TAKEN. 6 . TYPE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION AND AGENCY THAT CONDUCTED THE INVESTIGATION. 7 . ORGANIZATION TO WHICH ASSIGNED. 8 . SCI ACCESSES HELD, IF INDOCTRINATION PENDING, SO STATE. 9 . ANY PUBLICITY ANTICIPATED AND TO WHAT EXTENT

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 21 Figure 2. Incident Report Format d. A ppeals Process. All personnel who are the subject of an adverse SCI eligibility determination are afforded the opportunity to appeal the determination subject to the provisions of ICPG 704.3 (Reference (s)). The determination authority is responsible for providing appeal procedures. The following requirements apply equally to denials or revocations of SCI access. Individuals shall be: (1) P rovided a comprehensive and detailed written explanation of the reasons for the intended denial or revocation. (2) Provided upon request, to the extent permitted by law, any documentation upon which a denial or revocation was based. (3) Informed of the right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense and of their right to request documents. FM: LOCAL SSO T O: (SUPPORTING ADJUDICATION FACILITY) I NFO: SSO (AS REQUIRED) C LASSIFICATION (AS REQUIRED) S UBJ: DEROGATORY REPORT 1 . LAST NAME/FIRST NAME/MIDDLE INITIAL/SURNAME., ETC. 2 . RANK/SERVICE/SSN DESIGNATOR OR MOS. 3 . ACCESSES AND DATES DEBRIEFED. 4 . REASON FOR REPORT. 5 . CERTIFICATION OF SCI ELIGIBILITY/REFERENCE/SSBI DATE/CCN 6. S CI NdS DATE/FINAL TOP SECRET DATE. 7 . REMARKS (AS REQUIRED).

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 22 (4) Provided an opportunity to reply in writing within 45 days of receipt of relevant doc umentation and to submit evidence on his or her behalf. (5) Provided written notice of and reasons for the results of the review, the identity of the deciding authority, and written notice of the right to appeal. (6) Provided an opportunity to appeal in writing to a higher level Appea ls panel. (7) Provided an opportunity to appear personally and present relevant evidence and information before an adjudicative authority or other authority as determined by the DoD Component head. e. R einstatement of SCI Access. Reinstatement of S CI access may be granted under the following circumstances: (1) Revalidation of need to know by responsible HICE or designee. ( 2) Receipt of new favorable SCI eligibility determination by cognizant CAF. 10. RECIPROCITY OF ACCESSES (TRANSFER-IN-S TATUS). Individuals who temporarily or permanently transfer to another DoD agency that requires the individual to maintain access to SCI may have their SCI indoctrination paperwork passed from the losing organization to the gaining organization. This transfer eliminates the necessity for the transferring individual to duplicate the indoctrination paperwork at the gaining organization. A transfer-in-status may be initiated by either the losing or the gaining organization’s SSO. 11. PERIODIC REINVESTIG ATION (PR) PROCEDURES. PRs shall be conducted as prescribed in Reference (k). a. The PR must be initiated no later than 5 years after the completion date of the last investigation. The individuals concerned shall be contacted to complete a new Standard Form (SF) 86, “Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” to cover the period since the last SSBI or SSBI-PR was completed. Fingerprint cards will be submitted through the investigative agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for initial investigations. b. The local SCI security official shall review completed statements of personal history to determine if any relevant personnel security information has been excluded prior to submission to the investigative provider. If the individual fails to submit the requested PR package, SCI security officials should determine the cause (e.g., notification of expiration not received, access no longer required) prior to any automatic termination of SCI access. 12. CHANGES IN PERSONAL STATUS. Individuals with SCI access shall expeditiously notify their respective local SCI security official or CSSO of any significant change in personal

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 23 status. Failure to comply with reporting requirements may adversely affect an individual’s continuing eligibility for SCI access. Significant changes include but are not limited to the following: a. Change in Marital Status. Changes in marital status include marriage, intent to marry, or marriage to a foreign national, divorce, or proposed name change. Cohabitants are treated as spouses in this context. Waivers shall be reviewed by the supporting CAF on a case-by-case basis. Marriage to, or cohabitation with, a foreign national shall be grounds for re-evaluation of SCI access. SCI-indoctrinated personnel shall report to the supporting SCI security official or SSO in advance of their intention to marry or live with a foreign national. The notification of marriage or cohabitation shall include: (1) Complete information of the prospective spouse/cohabitant and his or her immediate family members. (2) The type of visa or alien status of the intended spouse or cohabitant and their immediate family members (if resident in the United States, its territories, or possessions), and whether these persons intend to become American citizens. (3) The nature and extent of relationship with the intended spouse or cohabitant’s family. (4) The vocational or political ties of the intended spouse or cohabitant and their immediate family with their government. b. Change in Association with Foreign Nationals. Casual contact is unplanned, non- recurring contact with a foreign national with no deliberate effort by either party to affect recurrence. Changes in previously reported casual contact with foreign nationals must be reported when such contact develops into close and continuous personal associations. c. Other Significant Changes. Significant changes include, but are not limited to , a legal name change, credit judgments, tax liens, wage garnishments, foreclosures, excessive debt, bankruptcy filing or repossessions, and adverse involvement with law enforcement agencies including arrests for alcohol-related driving infractions. It also excludes traffic offense when fines are less than $300 and do not involve alcohol or drugs. 13. EMPLOYEE OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES a. Potential conflicts with an individual’s responsibility to protect SCI material may arise from outside employment or other outside activity to include contact or association with foreign nationals. In cases where such employment or association has resulted in a suspected or established compromise of SCI, the local SCI security official and supporting CI activity must be advised immediately. Involvement in non-U.S. Government employment or activities that raise potential conflicts with an individual’s responsibility to protect SCI information is of security concern and must be reviewed by an SCI security official to determine whether the conflict is of such a nature that the individual’s SCI access should be reevaluated.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 24 b. Individuals who have or are being considered for SCI access must report in writing to the local SCI security official any existing or contemplated outside employment or activity that meets the two criteria below. In addition, an initial or updated SF 86 must include details of such outside employment or activities. (1) The employment includes compensated or volunteer service with any foreign nation; with a representative of any foreign interest; or with any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, or foreign affairs. (2) The employment or activity raises doubt as to an individual’s willingness or ability to safeguard SCI information. In this circumstance, the servicing SSO shall advise the individual that continuing such employment or activity may result in withdrawal of SCI access and shall provide the individual an opportunity to discontinue such employment or activity. If the individual terminates the employment or activity of security concern, the individual’s SCI access approval(s) may be continued provided this is otherwise consistent with national security requirements. c. T he provisions of this section of this enclosure (paragraphs 13.a. and 13.b., in their entirety) shall be made available to individuals for reading during SCI indoctrination. Annual security education for SCI-indoctrinated individuals shall advise them: (1) T o report in writing to their local SCI security officer any existing or contemplated outside employment or activity that appears to meet the above criteria. ( 2) That the written report must be submitted before accepting the outside employment or activity. 14. PERSONNEL SECURITY FILES. SSOs shall maintain the following information: a. Personnel security files on each SCI-indoctrinated person during assignment and for a minimum of 180 days after accountability of the person ceases. The files maintained under this provision shall include: (1) SCI indoctrination information, SCI debriefing, and a copy of DD Form 1847-1; unless JPAS shows the date the NdS was previously executed. (CSSOs shall maintain copies of this information as provided by the CSA or supporting SSO, or as produced in fulfilling their responsibilities as CSSO.) (2) Copies of other pertinent security personnel actions or defensive security briefings and debrief memoranda such as conflict of interest briefings for reservists. (3) Copies of reports of credible derogatory information, reports of changes in personal status, and other related paperwork such as security violation reports that may adversely affect a

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 25 person’s continuing eligibility for SCI access or result in referrals to counterintelligence (CI) agencies. (4) P re-indoctrination screening interviews, foreign contact reports, foreign travel notifications, foreign travel reports, and the annual briefing on reporting foreign contacts. b. J ustifications for SCI access and approvals or disapprovals shall be maintained for 2 years after accountability ceases. (This requirement does not apply to contractors.) 15. SECURITY PRE-P UBLICATION REVIEW PROCESS a. Review of Proposed Public Statements. DoD SCI-indoctrinated personnel are encouraged to participate as speakers in recognized forums and to submit professional papers. Such participation encourages the exchange of information and promotes professional growth. All proposed public statements on information derived from SCI or concerning SCI operations, sources, or methods must be reviewed and approved before release by the appropriate HICE or designee. (1) A n SCI-indoctrinated or debriefed individual shall submit for security review, prior to public disclosure in any form, all material intended for disclosure that may contain SCI or SCI-derived information. The material shall be submitted to the department or agency that last authorized the individual’s access to such information. Review action must start without delay. (2) The SCI prepublication review in no way absolves an individual from following the requirements of DoDI 5230.09 (Reference (t)) or other regulations requiring certain military or DoD persons to submit material for review prior to public release. ( 3) The SCI security officer receiving the material shall make an initial review and coordinate the review as required. If a determination cannot be made initially as to whether SCI is involved, the material shall be forwarded through SCI channels to the command, Defense Agency, or Military Service level for review. b. Review of Resumes and Applications for Employment. Resumes or applications for employment which detail technical expertise gained through government employment in classified or sensitive programs must be written in an unclassified context even if the potential employer is known to be a cleared defense contractor. A security review should be requested to resolve questions or concerns regarding possible classified content prior to submission to a potential employer. The following statement is appropriate for use in resumes or applications regarding clearance status when seeking employment with an organization involved in classified programs: “CLEARED FOR TOP SECRET INFORMATION AND GRANTED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION BASED ON SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION COMPLETED ON (DATE).”

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 26 (1) The individual’s servicing SCI security official can provide SSBI completion dates and case control numbers. Do not indicate or provide digraphs or trigraphs on a resume or job application. ( 2) The local SCI security official shall establish local written procedures for security reviews or pre-publication reviews. The requirements for security review and prepublication review shall be part of the annual security education program. The local SCI security official shall effect proper local coordination with the appropriate Government agency public affairs or information office and conduct a prepublication review for any public release of information that may possibly contain SCI. 16. CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS. SCI-indoctrinated personnel must protect themselves against cultivation and possible exploitation by foreign nationals who are or may be working for foreign intelligence services and to whom they might unwittingly provide sensitive or classified national security information. SIOs shall provide implementing guidance for the administration of the following policy, as established in Reference (f), for individuals under their security cognizance. a. Persons with SCI access have a continuing responsibility to report, within 72 hours, to their local SCI security official (or immediate supervisor if an SCI security official cannot be contacted within 72 hours) all contacts: (1) In which illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified, sensitive, or proprietary information or technology, either within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities. Personnel should be skeptical of requests for information that go beyond the bounds of innocent curiosity or normal business inquiries. (2) With known or suspected intelligence officers from any country. (3) With, or invitations from, foreign government officials. b. U nless specifically approved by the appropriate HICE, designee, or SIO, DoD SCI- indoctrinated personnel shall not initiate contact with foreign government representatives, accept invitations to attend any official or social foreign function, or extend reciprocal invitations. DoD personnel whose official duties require them to deal officially and socially with foreign nationals must limit their contact and association to the requirements of their duties. c. Defense Attaché System personnel and other personnel whose duties require re gular official contact with foreign government representatives and other foreign nationals are exempt from the approval requirements and from reporting of foreign contacts directly associated with their duties, except as required by their agency’s regulations. The HICE, designee, or SIO may exempt other personnel, on a case-by-case basis, whose duties require regular contact with foreign nationals.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 27 (1) Defense Attaché System personnel and other personnel whose duties require regular c ontact with foreign government representatives and other foreign nationals are not exempt from the 72-hour reporting requirement whenever an incident occurs as described in paragraph 16.a. of this enclosure. (2) Based on the foreign contact report, the SSO or SCI security official may require the reporting individual to complete a foreign contact questionnaire (see Appendix 3 to this enclosure). The SCI security official shall forward a copy to the local supporting CI activity for action and retain an information copy in the individual’s personnel security file. Discussions of any contact reports shall be restricted to those with a demonstrated need to know. Under no circumstances shall the individuals involved, their supervisor, or the local SCI security officer make any attempt to investigate such matters. Investigations of any contact reports shall be the responsibility of the appropriate CI activity. d. F ailure to report foreign contacts as required above may result in reevaluation of eligibility for continued SCI access. This reporting requirement does not imply that an individual shall automatically be subject to administrative action if he or she reports questionable contacts or associations. e. Local SCI security officers shall ensure that DoD SCI-indoctrinated personnel are briefed annually on their responsibility to report foreign contacts and maintain a record showing the dates that the individuals were briefed. f . These procedures are not intended to inhibit or discourage contact with foreign nationals. They are meant to properly document and disseminate the contacts and associations and all relevant information obtained. 17. FOREIGN TRAVEL a. P rocedures . Personnel with SCI access who plan official or unofficial foreign travel shall: (1) R eport anticipated foreign travel through their immediate supervisors and to the SSO or local SCI security official (see Appendix 4 to this enclosure). Failure to report foreign travel may result in reevaluation of eligibility for continued SCI access. (2) Obtain a defensive travel security briefing or a risk -of-capture briefing from your supporting security office prior to travel. Briefings provide situational concepts of threats that can be encountered, regardless of the country of intended travel. Threat situations shall include those from foreign intelligence services, terrorist or narcotics groups, or indigenous groups active in promoting insurgency, war, civil disturbance, or other acts of aggression when physical safety and security of personnel cannot be reasonably provided. (3) Report any unusual incidents occurring during travel.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 28 b. Defensive Travel Security and Risk-o f Capture Briefings (1) D efensive travel briefings alert personnel to the potential for harassment, exploitation, provocation, capture, entrapment, or criminal activity and provide courses of action to mitigate adverse security and personal consequences. The briefings also suggest passive and active measures to avoid becoming targets or inadvertent victims. An example of a defensive security briefing is provided as Appendix 5 to this enclosure. (2) A risk -of-capture briefing alerts personnel of techniques used to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained, and suggests courses of action to avoid or limit such divulgence. (3) Supervisors shall inform personnel to be knowledgeable of threat conditions, monitor the itinerary from a safety point of view, and follow-up on security-related issues. c. Classification Guidance. Details about a traveler's access to SCI or his or her itinerary may require classification as determined by an original classification authority or a security classification guide. A ppendixes 1. Guidelines for the Conduct of Personnel Screening Interviews and Questionnaire 2. Conflict of Interest Security Education Briefing for Reservists 3. Foreign Contact Questionnaire 4. Foreign Travel Questionnaire 5. Defensive Security Briefing

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE 2 29 APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE 2 GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL SCREENING INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES 1. PREPARATION. Before conducting the pre-SCI indoctrination interview, the SSO or SCI security official shall review all available command personnel and security records. 2. SCOPE. Q uestions asked during the course of an interview must have a relevance to a SCI indoctrination determination. Care must be taken not to inject improper matters into the security interview. For example, religious convictions, opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs, and affiliations of a non-subversive nature such as membership in labor unions are generally irrelevant topics. The interviewer must be able to explain the relevance of all inquiries, if subsequently required to do so. The screening questionnaire should cover, at a minimum, the questions included in Figure 1 of this Appendix. 3. PROCEDURES a. T he subject should be advised that: the purpose of the security interview is to assist in determining the subject’s continued acceptability for access to SCI based upon Reference (f) criteria; the interviewer is not associated with any investigative or law enforcement agency; the subject is not suspected of any wrong doing; the interview is completely voluntary and may be terminated at any time. The subject shall be given the same Privacy Act advisement as was provided with the SF 86. The interview is an administrative screening process; therefore, a warning to the subject about self-incrimination shall not be required. b. T he interviewer shall offer the subject the opportunity to contribute any information the subject feels may be pertinent. The subject shall be informed that the procedure is designed to preclude any future judgment that the subject intentionally withheld significant security issue information. c. If the subject refuses to be interviewed or declines to provide information in response to specific pertinent questions, contact the appropriate HICE or designee for guidance. d. T he interviewing SSO or SCI security official shall determine whether to continue an individual’s SCI access based on the results of the interview or to refer the results to the appropriate CAF for review.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE 2 30 Figure 3. Personnel Screening Interview Question Set PERSONNEL SCREENING INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE The purpose of this interview is to assure that you continue to meet the standards for access to SCI in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive 704. 1. Has your marital status changed since you completed your SF 86; have you married or divorced, or begun cohabitating? 2 . Are all members of your immediate family U.S. citizens? 3. Do you or anyone in your immediate family claim a dual citizenship with another country? 4. Have you visited any foreign countries since you completed your SF 86? If so, please provide the dates, the countries visited and the reason for the visits. 5. Have you consulted with a mental health professional since you completed your SF 86? Was this court ordered or based on violence on member’s part? If yes, please explain. 6. Have you been arrested since your last investigation? I f yes, please explain. 7. Have you ever had any adverse involvement with alcohol (e.g., DUI, alcohol treatment, drunk in public, accident where alcohol was a factor)? If so, please explain. 8. Have you used illegal drugs or illicit substances since you completed your last SF 86? If yes, please explain. 9. Have you had a clearance suspended, denied, or revoked since your last investigation or in the last seven years? If yes, please explain. 10. Have you had any bills referred to a collection agency since you last completed an SF 86? If yes, please explain. 11. Have your wages been garnished, have you had any vehicles repossessed, have any tax liens been placed against you, or have you filed bankruptcy? If so, please explain.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 2 TO ENCLOSURE 2 31 APPENDIX 2 TO ENCLOSURE 2 CONFLICT OF INTEREST SECURITY EDUCATION BRIEFING FOR RESERVISTS Figure 4 Conflict of Interest Security Education Briefing for Reservists Sample CONFLICT OF INTEREST SECURITY EDUCATION BRIEFING FOR RESERVISTS 1. All personnel granted access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) are legally bound to protect and safeguard the information under the guidelines set forth by the Nondisclosure Statement (NdS). 2. Reserve military members are authorized to use their SCI access only when they are under official military orders and a valid “need to know” exists. All information protected through the various SCI programs can be used only to support and assist the operational endeavors of the Department of Defense, not the individual or the civilian firm. All personnel must be aware of this delicate balance. Any disregard of these procedures could potentially cause serious security problems to arise or undue embarrassment to the Department. The individual is legally bound by the obligation set forth in the NdS. 3. A few simple precautionary measures can prevent a conflict of interest. The SCI security badge is to be used only when on official military orders. The SCI security badge should be maintained by the administrative office that supports each individual’s reserve duties. If there are problems identifying the support personnel, each individual must contact the SSO. Next, verify through the SSO the proper level of SCI accesses. SCI accesses obtained through civilian employment or external Government agencies shall not suffice. All DoD SCI accesses must be authorized and approved through the proper cognizant authority. 4. In summary, any information gained while in an indoctrinated status can be used only in support of military issues. The transfer of SCI from one agency to another, either verbally or by documentation, can only be accomplished through proper security channels. If ever in doubt as to the proper security procedures, contact your local Special Security Office for advice.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 3 TO ENCLOSURE 2 32 APPENDIX 3 TO ENCLOSURE 2 FOREIGN CONTACT QUESTIONNAIRE 1. F oreign contact questionnaires shall contain, at a minimum: a. I nformation regarding the foreign contact, such as: (1) Contact’s name, citizenship, and profession/affiliation ( 2) Date and place of occurrence of contact. b. C ontact details, such as: (1) M anner in which the individual initiated contact (e.g. casual contact at foreign function). (2) Sex and ethnicity of the individual. (3) Did the individual seem to control the direction of the conversation? (4) Did the individual ask where you work or what kind of work you do? (5) Did you discuss your involvement in government- related activities? (6) Did the individual ask about your political affiliations? (7) Did the individual offer to pay for anything or make any special arrangement on your behalf? (8) Have you received any gifts from the individual? (9) D id you exchange contact information with the individual? (10) Did the individual express interest in any further contact? c. A physical description of the individual. d. A list of topics in which the individual expressed an interest which you believe are classified, sensitive, or proprietary. 2 . Once filled out, the contact questionnaire shall be retained by the cognizant security official for additional action as necessary.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 4 TO ENCLOSURE 2 33 APPENDIX 4 TO ENCLOSURE 2 FOREIGN TRAVEL QUESTIONNAIRE 1. Prior to proceeding on either official or unofficial travel outside of the United States, travelers shall complete a foreign travel questionnaire to be returned to the cognizant security official as soon as possible prior to the proceed date. This questionnaire shall elicit, at a minimum: a. The name, date of birth, place of birth, and SSAN of the traveler. b. The traveler’s job title. c. The full itinerary for the trip, including flight numbers and arrival/departure times. d. T he purpose of the travel (i.e., business or recreation). If travel is related to official government business, traveler should list the point of contact he/she is to meet with and the purpose of the meeting. e. The country (or countries) to be visited and the dates of travel. f. The passport type (i.e., tourist, official, diplomatic), the passport number, and expiration date. 2. U pon return from travel, the traveler shall complete a secondary questionnaire that shall elicit, at a minimum: a. Were any problems encountered at the time of arrival or departure from the foreign country (or countries)? b. Was the traveler subjected to any harassment, suspected surveillance, unusual customs inspection, etc., during the trip? c. Were any travel restrictions imposed by the country (or countries) during the visit? d. Were any changes made to the itinerary while on route? e. Were any probing inquiries made relative to the traveler’s job duties, studies, or organization (if yes, traveler must complete a foreign contact questionnaire as described in Appendix 10 to Enclosure 2 of this Volume)? f. Did traveler meet a foreign national who requested future contact (if yes, traveler must complete a foreign contact questionnaire as described in Appendix 3 to Enclosure 2 of this Volume)? g. Was the traveler a victim of a criminal act?

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 4 TO ENCLOSURE 2 34 h. Was the traveler detained or arrested? i. Did the traveler lose any official materials or personal luggage?

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 35 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 DEFENSIVE SECURITY BRIEFING 1. I NTRODUCTION. Persons granted access to SCI incur special security obligations and should be aware of possible risks inherent to foreign travel. Persons planning foreign travel should contact their SSO to determine their organization’s foreign travel and foreign contact policy. The following information is a general purpose travel briefing. Detailed briefings may be obtained from the nearest military intelligence or counterintelligence representative. 2. PURPOSE. U.S. military, Government, civilian and defense contractor personnel are considered prime targets of Foreign Intelligence Services and terrorist groups. The purpose of this briefing is to acquaint the traveler with the risks involved in traveling to foreign countries and to furnish you guidance that may enable you to minimize those risks. 3. B ACKGROUND. Many foreign countries offer interesting travel brochures, special rates, and other inducements through U.S. branches of their travel bureaus in efforts to attract the growing number of Americans traveling abroad. Past cases reveal that American personnel performing such travel may be subject to surveillance and collection operations by the various foreign intelligence services. Travelers may also be subject to terrorism or other acts of violence either by design or by circumstance. 4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (FIS) a . All foreign countries actively engage in the collection of intelligence information. However, whether they are “hostile,” “neutral,” or “allied,” there is no such thing as a “friendly” foreign intelligence service. b. T he main objective of any FIS is to gain advantage for their nation through the collection of information. Currently, the most prized type of intelligence is scientific and technological data, followed by the classified Government information, but unclassified material--even material which appears to be trivial can also be of inestimable value. Potentially, the most valuable sources of information are those acquired through the use of individuals recruited as agents by FIS. In addition to penetrating the Government and its official organizations, the penetration of commercial businesses, educational and private institutions involved in sensitive, national defense- related research and development work can be of tremendous value. Of course, the single greatest achievement an intelligence organization can have is the placement or recruitment of an agent directly in a sensitive position in a national defense or intelligence element of another government. ( 1) FIS are relentless and seek information wherever, whenever, and from whomever they can and employ any and all tactics necessary to target, recruit and exploit potential sources. Among the tactics they may use against U.S. personnel is a smooth, subtle, seemingly guileless

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 36 approach— befriending targets, treating them to gifts or money, wining and dining them in the belief that Americans are hopeless materialists who can be swayed easily by appeals to their greed. ( 2) Recognizing that most Americans are generally friendly and gregarious people who enjoy talking to others, FIS operatives frequently employ a seemingly innocuous and very effective method of intelligence gathering known as “elicitation.” Elicitation is the art and science of engaging someone in simple, “innocent” conversation for the purpose of getting the targeted individual to speak openly and more in-depth and, possibly reveal classified information on topics of interest to FIS operatives. Practiced by experts, the target of elicitation may not even realize that he or she has been elicited until “too much” has been said. Elicitation is smooth and insidious. Beware of it! ( 3) In another maneuver known as the “False Flag” approach, an FIS operative misrepresents himself as a citizen of a country friendly to the United States. Thus, a targeted American may be duped into handing over information by being led to believe he is aiding an ally of the United States. In a variation of this tactic, FIS agents may pose as representatives of a country towards which a targeted American is particularly sympathetic. Also, if an FIS agent believes an individual has similar sympathies, he or she may make an appeal for information based on ideology. A “pitch” for information may also be geared to take advantage of an American’s desire for international harmony and world peace. Similarly, certain FIS organizations not only routinely charge their own citizen-students studying abroad in the U.S. to collect information but, also regularly target Americans of their own ethnicity using a variety of tactics to include everything from bribery and patriotic appeals to support their “mother country” to outright blackmail and threats. ( 4) Another favored appeal exploits the American belief in freedom of speech and the free exchange of information. For example, an FIS agent in the role of a scientist may suggest to an American scientist that science has no political boundaries. Therefore, in the interest of science, the American is encouraged to share his knowledge with a fellow “member” of the international scientific community. ( 5) FIS also use aggressive means in their ceaseless quest for strategic information. Espionage is their business and patriotic duty. If they feel coercion and blackmail shall serve their purpose, they shall not hesitate to employ those methods. As you travel, do not place yourself in a compromising position by engaging in abnormal or promiscuous sexual behavior, black marketing, violating local laws, or photographing or straying into restricted areas. FIS keep travelers under constant surveillance by using agents, video and photographic surveillance, and bugging devices in hotel rooms, bars, restaurants, lounges, and telephones. Such methods may provide them the material to entrap an unwary traveler. ( 6) Harassment and provocation are other tools that may be employed by FIS. Travelers may be placed in unusual situations that may cause an incident or elicit a response that would entangle or compromise an individual.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 37 5. TERRORIST, CRIMINAL, AND MOB VIOLENCE a. T errorists have a different objective than FIS— they are interested in “sensationalism” or other use that can be derived from the compromise, embarrassment, interrogation, kidnapping, or death of a U.S. citizen. The threat changes constantly and is contingent upon the country and area visited along with world events. However, from a general perspective, the threat of terrorism to a traveler should be considered minimal, unless the traveler happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. As with FIS, a terrorist group must know the “who, where, when, and how,” to target a specific individual. Therefore, maintaining a “low profile” and not drawing undue attention to one’s affiliation with the U.S. Government is essential. Even though an individual may not be targeted for terrorism, an individual can still become a victim of terrorism. Being in the wrong place at the wrong time may be unavoidable, but the risk of being a chance victim of terrorism can still be reduced. Remember, most terrorists select “soft” targets like commercial establishments and individuals residing within that country. For the most part, except in situations where FIS is supporting, sponsoring, or otherwise has a relationship with a particular terrorist organization, terrorists do not have sophisticated collection capabilities to determine names of a traveler and then target that person. They prefer to concentrate on individuals residing in-country. b. C riminal or Mob Violence . No matter where anyone travels, criminal elements (thieves, muggers, etc.) are present. The foreign traveler is a good target because the traveler may be disadvantaged by being in an unfamiliar place, ignorant of local laws, and unable to freely communicate because of a language barrier. In unstable political areas or where the United States is unwelcome, the presence of a U.S. citizen may be enough provocation to cause an incident or become a victim of mob violence. Any minor incident or breach of law or custom involving a U.S. citizen can be blown vastly out of proportion creating a much larger incident. 6. TRAVEL GUIDANCE. C ommon-sense rules for any traveler are often overlooked in the rush to acquire tickets, hotel reservations, visas, etc.: a. Personal Concerns ( 1) Travelers should not reference their intelligence affiliation or access to classified information. ( 2) Travelers should not bring any personal objects with them that they cannot afford to lose. This applies especially to jewelry items. Carry traveler’s checks and one or two major credit cards, not large amounts of cash. ( 3) Travelers should make a copy of the identification page of their passport before their departure and take it with them. Copies should be kept separate from the passport itself. Also, travelers should memorize their passport number. While traveling, travelers should leave their passport and any unneeded money locked in a hotel safe-deposit box. If local law does not require persons to keep their passport with them, travelers should carry only the photocopy of their passport and driver’s license when leaving the hotel.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 38 ( 4) Travelers should advise the U.S. Embassy in each host country of their complete itinerary. Keep in contact and record the address and telephone number of the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in each host or major city in which a visit is planned. ( 5) Travel with several passport size photos. In some areas, it can be difficult to replace photos on short notice if your passport is lost or stolen. ( 6) U. S. driver’s licenses are valid in Canada and Western Europe; elsewhere you shall need an international driver’s permit available from the American Automobile Association. Even with an international permit, foreigners are forbidden to drive in countries such as Egypt, Vietnam, China, and Nepal. Know local traffic laws and penalties, which may be severe. In Indonesia, for example, fines for not wearing a seat belt can be $1,500. ( 7) The Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Overseas Citizen Services provides current, country-specific threat information and offers consular information sheets, travel warnings, public announcements, tips for travelers brochures, visa bulletins, and other consular information. Callers outside the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area are charged the cost of a long distance phone call, but there are no additional charges for this service. They may also be contacted through the internet at www.travel.state.gov. (8) Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747) or via www.cdc.gov/travel for reports of medical alerts in foreign countries. ( 9) Travelers should ensure their medical insurance covers the travel. Personal health insurance policies may be valid while you are visiting Europe, but may not cover individuals while white-water rafting in Canada. ( 10) Carry ample supplies of pain relievers, antacids, diarrhea and motion-sickness remedies, antibiotic cream, gauze bandages, water-purification tablets, insect repellent, sunscreen and prescription medication. ( 11) Travelers should carry prescription medications in their original containers. Travelers can be detained during a custom’s search and questioned concerning the pills. ( 12) Medical or dental service should be obtained only from a U.S. Government facility or from persons or institutions approved by U.S. Embassy officials. b. H otel Concerns ( 1) Be careful about leaving items in hotel room safes. Safe-deposit boxes in a hotel lobby are better, but the best are similar to those in a U.S. bank, with two keys and under 24-hour observation. Do not leave valuables or important papers lying around your hotel room.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 39 ( 2) Do not stay above the sixth floor. Many foreign fire companies do not have ladders that go beyond this floor. The third floor is your best choice. Occupants of rooms lower than the third floor are subject to a higher degree of burglaries or robberies by people entering from the street. c. Airport and Customs Concerns ( 1) Be careful to make an accurate and complete declaration of money (including traveler’s checks), credit cards, and all valuables (including cameras and jewelry whether worn or carried). It is imperative to retain a copy of this declaration until departure. Use only authorized banks and currency exchanges. ( 2) Security screening process at international airports shall vary depending upon the country visited. Arrive at the airport at least 2 hours prior to departure. This allows for ample time to pass through the security screening process. Do not linger in the airport ticketing area after checking-in. This is the most vulnerable section of the airport and has been the repeated target for terrorist groups. Proceed to the security area as soon as possible. Questions asked by airport security officials may sound like the officer is conducting an interrogation. The officer is looking for indications of possible criminal or terrorist activity. Be cooperative and answer all questions truthfully. Airport security officials may be especially concerned with electronic devices, so travelers should be forthcoming about any in their possession. In Germany, airport officials have been known to request individuals to extract the batteries from the devices before boarding the aircraft. Other countries may have similar policies. ( 3) Laptop computers are a focus of security people because they have been used to hide drugs and explosives in the past. Countries in Central and South America and Europe may be particularly concerned with laptop computers. Persons traveling with a laptop should be prepared to demonstrate its functions at all security checkpoints. d. Crime Prevention ( 1) Contact a DAO or Consulate or Embassy Regional Security Officer about the local situation if necessary. Find out which parts of town local inhabitants consider risky. Stay in well lit areas; do not use short cuts or narrow alleys. Be especially alert in crowds. Thieves often strike when travelers are distracted. The most common sites for thefts to occur are tourist spots, shopping areas, transportation centers, and train stations. Dress modestly and be discreet. ( 2) Theft is common on overnight trains. Place luggage under the seat rather than on overhead racks. Keep valuables under the pillow or in a safe pack around the neck or waist. If traveling in a group, sleep in shifts. ( 3) Men, if possible, should keep their wallet in a front pocket. Frustrate pickpockets by taking the following precautions: wrap rubber bands around the wallet to make it difficult for a pickpocket to remove it, keep the wallet with a comb through the fold with the teeth facing upward so it shall catch on the pocket lining if removed, place a handkerchief over your wallet or place the wallet in your pocket sideways. Women, if possible, don't carry a handbag. They are considered

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 40 an “easy target” for thieves. They simply take the bag and run, resulting sometimes in physical injury to the carrier. If travelers need to carry a handbag, do not carry money or identification in it. Hide all valuables on your person. Money belts or pouches worn on the outside of clothing or loosely hung around the neck are easily cut or ripped off. Remember, wearing them on the outside highlights where you keep all your valuables. (4) In areas noted for carjacking or tourist robberies, make sure rental vehicles do not have special license plates or agency stickers. ( 5) When driving, stow belongings in the car’s trunk rather than on the back seat. Keep windows up and doors locked. Empty the trunk at night, even if the parking area is guarded. ( 6) In the event of a flat tire, drive to a service station or busy intersection before stopping. If the vehicle breaks down, wait inside for assistance from police or an authorized repair person with proper identification. ( 7) Be cautious of sexual overtures from anyone. Aside from the potential health hazards, prostitutes are often the decoys who steer you into becoming a victim of other crimes, such as robbery and extortion. From a CI perspective, offers of sexual companionship have historically been a method used by FIS in an attempt to compromise Government employees and Government contractors. ( 8) Attempt to know the laws and rules of the country to be visited. Do not engage in black marketing or other illegal activities. Do not engage in black market currency exchanges or other illegal transactions. Depending upon the country’s exchange rate, the financial advantage of engaging in such activity may be substantial, but it is not worth the risk. ( 9) Do not attempt to propagandize or engage in political arguments. Many foreign nationals are curious about the United States, and are genuinely interested in talking to Americans. Their questions are best answered in an objective forthright manner without drawing unfavorable comparisons with the country visited. ( 10) Be careful about accepting invitations. Do not overindulge in drinking or engage in promiscuous activities. Audio (listening) devices and hidden photographic cameras are often planted in rooms. Depending upon the country visited, if invited to a foreign national’s residence, or to any other form of private gathering, try to keep at least one other member of your group with you. Travelers should maintain a healthy skepticism toward persons who seem to attach themselves to them. Overly friendly tourist guides, interpreters, or maids, who show an undue interest should put the traveler on the alert. Do not trust interpreters with matters of confidence. ( 11) Do not accept letters, personal messages, photographs, packages, or other material to be carried openly or smuggled in or out of the country. ( 12) Travelers generally are NOT under individual surveillance during visits; however, if he or she suspects that they are being watched, resist any temptation to “play games” with what may seem to be clumsy attempts to keep an eye on you. Do not attempt to lose real or imagined

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 41 surveillance by taking evasive maneuvers, searching your room for listening devices (“bugs”), or attempting to play tricks on such “bugs.” This sort of action only serves to arouse suspicion and may result in increased foreign security attention and possibly harassment. e. General Comments ( 1) Do behave in a natural manner, use good judgment, and enjoy the trip. ( 2) Maintain a “low profile” by: ( a) Blending in with local populace. ( b) Wearing suitable attire -- do not over or under dress. ( c) Being sensitive to local customs and laws. ( d) Traveling in pairs or small groups of no more than four people. ( e) Using rental rather than official cars if possible. ( f) Not flaunting American citizenship or attaching an “air of importance” to yourself. ( g) Not being aggressive or insulting to the native population. ( h) Ensuring that your itinerary is not publicized, but given to those who have a “need to know.” ( 3) The following are suggestions for personal safety: ( a) Unobtrusively inspect under seats and seat cushions on airplanes or other modes of transportation. ( b) Inspect the rental vehicle for signs of tampering. ( c) Park and lock car in a secure area. ( d) Avoid lingering in potential threat areas such as general terminal areas at airports or lingering in front of official buildings being visited. ( 4) Never pick up souvenirs, statues, or artifacts just because they appear to be lying around or unclaimed. Purchase such items in approved shops only, making certain that a receipt is provided for each purchase. Do not sign any receipts for money or services, unless first assured of and furnished an on-the-spot copy which clearly identifies and itemizes the nature of the transaction.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 42 ( 5) Do not make or write any statements that might be exploited for propaganda purposes. Do not sign petitions, however innocent they may appear. ( 6) Do not photograph any military personnel, equipment, installation, defense plant, or other military or restricted area. Also, refrain from photographing slum areas, ghettos, or underprivileged persons in the host country. Do not photograph airports and train yards or other facilities that could be used for military purposes. ( 7) As a precaution, be aware that clothing may be tagged with invisible dyes or radioactive materials. This can be done at a dry cleaning establishment or in your room. If a letter were placed in the tagged pocket and later mailed, it could be retrieved and traced. ( 8) In writing letters, use personal stationery and not that given to you by any local hotel. Also purchase stamps at a post office or embassy. Stamps obtained at a hotel or other source can be tagged with invisible inks or radioactive tracers. Assume that letters shall be opened and read. If necessary to write about confidential matters, use appropriate channels of the Embassy or Consulate. ( 9) If detained, remember, tourists generally have nothing to worry about so long as they follow the local rules, and use good judgment. However, occasionally individuals do encounter trouble with authorities; either by mistake, or as the result of some injudicious action. Should this occur, the most important things to remember are: ( a) Insist on being put in contact with the American Consulate at once. If the authorities stall or attempt to intimidate, refuse to make any statement until this has been done. Experience shows that if an individual cannot be intimidated by vague or implied threats, the detainer shall usually back down if the individual has not, in fact, done anything wrong. ( b) Under no circumstances sign any document until you have had the opportunity to meet with a U.S. official. ( c) Remain calm, but assertive. Do not antagonize Government officials, but continue to insist on your right to speak with a representative of the U.S. Government. f. Hostage Situations. In the event of a hostage situation: ( 1) Do not physically resist, but passively cooperate with captors. ( 2) Prepare mentally for a long period of hostage negotiations. ( 3) Remember that although negotiations are usually lengthy, virtually all hostages are released unharmed. ( 4) Attempt to establish personal rapport with your captors, while at the same time maintaining personal dignity.

DoDM 5105.21-V3, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 09/14/2020 APPENDIX 5 TO ENCLOSURE 2 43 ( 5) Do not become involved in controversial discussions with the terrorists. ( 6) When a rescue party approaches, lie on the floor with your hands covering your head; do not move until instructed to do so by members of the rescue team. g. Air Travel. Military air or military/Government charter flights are preferred within CONUS. Non-stop commercial transcontinental flights are considered more vulnerable to possible hijacking than those making intermediate stops. Outside CONUS, every effort should be made to fly via military aircraft, diplomatic courier flight or military/Government charter flight. Commercial air travel aboard U.S. flag aircraft that does not have intermediate, weather, alternate or landing rights in “threat areas,” or areas of high vulnerability to hijacking is recommended. h. Hijackings. If U.S. military or Government civilian personnel should happen to be aboard an aircraft that has been hijacked: ( 1) If in uniform: ( a) Be as unobtrusive as possible. ( b) Do not attempt to take charge, demand privileges of rank, or openly advise other passengers as to their conduct. ( c) If asked for identification, show only passport (tourist if possible). ( 2) If in civilian clothing, do not offer to make known a U.S. military or Government affiliation unless forced to do so. Most persons previously placed in such a situation have been requested only to show some reasonable identification (e.g., driver’s license, passport, credit cards). ( 3) The traveler must keep in mind that, these are only “guidelines,” not “hard and fast” regulations that apply in all situations. The world and the rules have changed since 9/11. There are no guarantees. In all situations be adaptive and flexible. 7. REPORTING PROCEDURES. If you suspect an approach has been made, or you become involved or entrapped in a conspiracy to commit espionage, you are to report to the nearest U.S. Consulate, Attaché, Embassy Regional Security Officer or Post Duty Officer. If you have been indiscreet or otherwise compromised, he or she shall discuss the situation in confidence with a U.S. security representative. Above all, do not attempt to get out of an embarrassing situation by yourself, or assume the role of a self-appointed counterintelligence agent. 8. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. Any suspected approach made subsequent to travel should be reported through the traveler’s security officer or commander to the appropriate counterintelligence organization.