NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
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Enclosure (7) NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
1. Overview
a. It is important to distinguish authority and responsibilities for employment related determinations. Employment qualification is measured by experience, education, knowledge, skills, and abilities. Qualification determinations are normally made in the DON by the selecting official based on the information provided by the job applicant. Employment suitability, on the other hand, refers to identifiable character traits and conduct sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood that an individual will carry out assigned federal government duties with the necessary integrity or efficiency of the service. Suitability adjudication of background information typically occurs after the qualification determination; however, it may take place at any point during the hiring process, e.g., a final suitability determination may be made after review of a completed OF-306, after review of completed application material, or after review of a completed BI. No individual will be given access to classified information or be assigned to sensitive duties unless a favorable personnel security determination has been made regarding his/her loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness.
b. National security positions include those positions that involve activities of the Government that are concerned with the protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage; and positions that require regular use of, or access to, classified information or assignment in a sensitive position. The DON mission is such that most DON positions are sensitive national security positions. A national security position will not be downgraded or reclassified as non-sensitive solely to aid in recruiting personnel or to retain personnel who no longer possess national security eligibility as required for a position.
c. Only the following officials are authorized to request BI on individuals under their jurisdiction:
(1) COs of organizations and activities listed on the Standard Navy Distribution List and Marine Corps COs (Battalion or higher).
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2 Enclosure (7) (2) DCSA, Defense Vetting Directorate, Vetting Risk Operations Center (VROC), and DoD CAF.
(3) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
d. Suitability determinations are under the purview of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Civilian Personnel) (DASN (CP)) for employment. DON National Security Position suitability, for employees in positions not subject to suitability or fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the DoD as a contractor, determinations are under DUSN (S&I) purview and are governed by this instruction.
e. A BI is conducted to gather information pertinent to the determinations established in the Federal Investigative Standards (FIS) in accordance with reference (b). The scope of the investigation conducted will be commensurate with the level of sensitivity of the access required or position occupied in in accordance with reference (b). Only the minimum investigation to satisfy a requirement may be requested. DUSN (S&I) must give prior approval to establish investigative requirements in addition to, or at variance with, those established here.
f. The DCSA conducts (or controls the conduct of) all BIs for the DON. DON elements are prohibited from conducting BIs, including local public agency inquiries, unless specifically requested to do so by an authorized investigative agency. An exception to this restriction is made for DON overseas commands employing foreign nationals for duties not requiring access to classified material. Reference (b) provides further details.
g. BIs will not be requested for any civilian or military personnel who will be retired, reassigned, or separated with less than one year of service remaining.
2. Position Designation. In order to adjudicate suitability and to provide the appropriate level of (BI), positions are designated according to potential risk. Reference (b) requires that National Security positions, hereafter referred to as sensitive positions, be formally designated for federal civilians according to the position sensitivity level. A sensitive position is any position whose occupant could bring
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3 Enclosure (7) about, by virtue of the nature of the position, an adverse effect on the national security. There are three sensitivity levels:
a. Special-Sensitive (SS). Potential for inestimable impact and/or damage.
b. Critical-Sensitive (CS). Potential for grave to exceptionally grave impact and/or damage.
c. Noncritical Sensitive (NCS) Potential for some to serious impact and/or damage.
3. Criteria for Designating Sensitive Positions
a. SS and CS positions require a favorably adjudicated T5.
b. NCS positions require that civilian personnel in NCS positions require a favorably adjudicated Tier 3 (T3)(for temporary or interim eligibility). A National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) favorably completed during a previous military or contractor employment may be used to support civilian appointment provided a T3 has been submitted to the ISP and the individual has not had a 24-month break in service since completion of the last investigation.
c. Seasonal employees (including summer hires) normally do not require access to classified information. If the position requires access to classified information, the proper investigation will be initiated to meet the required access level (see para 6-1 for age limitations). BIs will not be submitted for individuals below the age of 16. With the exception of military personnel, minors who are under the age of 18, will not be investigated nor granted national security eligibility.
d. The process of designating sensitive positions is best accomplished in coordination with the human resource officer, the position supervisor, program manager, the security manager, or the appropriate IT authority. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Position Designation Tool:
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4 Enclosure (7) (https://www.opm.gov/suitability/suitability-executive- agent/position-designation-tool/) simplifies this process for civilian, contractors and consultants in national security positions. The CO may establish standard operating procedures to discharge this responsibility.
e. The sensitivity level assigned will dictate the personnel security requirements; the greater the sensitivity, the greater the personnel security requirements. Position designations will be at the highest level required by the incumbent’s specific duties. When the level of potential damage or privilege and other position characteristics appear to indicate differing levels of designation, the higher designation will always be used.
f. The position sensitivity is identified on OF 8, Position Description, (Block 12), for civilians and will be recorded in JPAS or successor system. The investigation submitted must correlate with the sensitivity level identified in JPAS or the successor system.
(1) Contracts, grants, and other legal agreements or understanding with non-DoD entities involving sensitive duties will incorporate the security requirements specified herein according to applicable policy and guidance sections of reference (b).
(2) The ASM will maintain a separate record of position designation decisions for civilian personnel, identifying the sensitivity level and listing the criteria most predominately responsible for the assigned sensitivity determination. Access to classified or sensitive information will normally be predominating.
4. Types of BI. The term BI refers to an information gathering inquiry, where specified information is collected from specified sources to support eligibility determinations for DoD military and civilian personnel, contractor employees, consultants, and other persons affiliated with the DoD for access to classified information, acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces, assignment or retention in sensitive national security positions, or other designated duties requiring such investigation. Investigations conducted for other basic purposes may have an impact on security
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5 Enclosure (7) clearance determinations but are not BIs (examples of other types are investigations of compromise, criminal activity, sabotage, espionage, or subversion).
5. Federal Investigative Standards (FIS) for Civilian, Military, and Contractor Personnel
a. FIS provides consistent standards for investigations, to facilitate reciprocity across the government, and to ensure cost-effective and efficient protection of national interests. The standards apply to investigations used to determine eligibility for access to classified information, to hold a national security position, for physical and logical access, and for suitability for government employment. The FIS established a new tier and naming system for BI. The scope of a PSI may be neither raised nor lowered without the approval of the DNI. The tiered national security investigations authorized for use within the DON are as follows for civilians, military, and contractor personnel:
(1) T3: Investigations conducted to this standard are for positions designated as NCS, and/or requiring eligibility for L access or access to Confidential or Secret information. This is the lowest level of investigation acceptable for access to classified information, using SF 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, or its successor form to include the below requirements for military personnel:
(a) A favorably adjudicated T3 is required for each enlisted member, commissioned officer, Warrant Officer, Midshipman and Reserve Officer Training Corps candidate before appointment in the Navy and Marine Corps, including Reserve components, at the time of initial entry into the service.
(b) All derogatory information revealed during the enlistment or appointment process that results in a waiver of accession standards will be fully explained in a written summary attached to and forwarded with the SF 86.
(c) The authority to take action to deny acceptance or retention in the Navy and Marine Corps, except for loyalty reasons, is vested in the CHNAVPERS and the CMC. Cases
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6 Enclosure (7) involving loyalty issues of Navy personnel will be forwarded to CNO for submission to DUSN (S&I) for referral to the SECNAV for action. Cases involving loyalty of USMC personnel will be forwarded to HQMC PP&O/PS for submission to DUSN (S&I) for referral to the SECNAV for action.
(d) A previously conducted BI valid for security clearance purposes may suffice for appointment or commissioning purposes. A new investigation is required upon reentry of officers and enlisted members if there has been a break in active service of greater than 24 months.
(e) Requests for investigation for Navy and Marine Corps reserve members will be submitted by the active duty command holding the service record or exercising administrative jurisdiction.
(2) T5. Investigations conducted to this standard are for positions designated as critical sensitive, special sensitive, and/or requiring eligibility for Q access or access to TS or SCI, using SF 86, or its successor form.
b. Reinvestigation. A reinvestigation updates a previous investigation and is authorized only for specific duties and access. All military members will undergo PR, maintain a favorable eligibility, and be subject to continuous evaluation. Civilian and contractor personnel will undergo PRs to the extent that the investigative coverage is proportional to the sensitivity level of the duties and/or access required. Reinvestigations may be performed at any time after national security eligibility has been granted. Additionally, DON employees in national security positions and contractor personnel performing national security duties without access to classified information will be subject to reinvestigation on a recurring basis. There are two tiered national security reinvestigations:
(1) Tier 3 Reinvestigation (T3R): T3R is the reinvestigation required for military, civilian, and contractor positions designated as non-critical sensitive, and/or requiring eligibility for L access or access to Confidential or Secret information, or assignment in a NCS position, respectively. T3Rs are also conducted at 10 years intervals for collateral positions or five-year intervals for personnel with Secret
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7 Enclosure (7) security clearance in SAPs and those performing Explosive Ordnance Disposal or Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) controlled duties. The reinvestigation will be initiated no later than five years from the close date of the previous investigation.
(2) T5R: T5Rs are conducted on each military, civilian, and contractor occupying a SS or CS position or requiring continued national security eligibility at an equivalent level will undergo a T5R every five years. The T5R is also required to support personnel security determinations on personnel with continued assignment to NATO billets requiring TS Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere, and Climate (COSMIC) access, Nuclear Weapons PRP, privileged access IT, Presidential Support Activities (PSA), access to SIOP-ESI, and for LAAs for non-U.S. citizens employees. The T5R investigative elements include: a National Agency Check (NAC) (except that a technical fingerprint check of FBI files is not conducted), a subject interview, a credit check, an employment check, neighborhood interviews, local agency checks, interviews of employers and developed character references, an ex-spouse interview, and additional investigation when warranted by the facts of the case.
c. Reinvestigations will not be initiated more than 30 days prior to the due date (the date the previous equivalent or higher level BI closed). Personnel assigned to a NATO staff positions may submit a reinvestigation request up to one year in advance of the required timeframe in accordance with reference (b).
d. Individuals in a SAP will submit reinvestigations in accordance with the provisions outlined in reference (b).
e. Reimbursable Suitability/Security Investigation (RSI). An investigation conducted to resolve personnel security issues that arise after a BI is conducted, evaluated, or adjudicated. RSIs are scoped as necessary to address the specific matters to be resolved. They usually consist of record checks and interviews with potentially knowledgeable persons. The subject of the investigation may be interviewed to resolve conflicting information and/or to provide an opportunity to refute or mitigate adverse information. The term "RSI" applies to limited
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8 Enclosure (7) inquiries, post-adjudication investigations, or other additional inquiries conducted by NBIB. If deemed appropriate, RSIs are requested by the DoD CAF to DCSA after coordination with the command. Commands will obtain the SF 86 as directed by the DoD CAF. RSIs do not cover investigations of criminal activity, sabotage, espionage, or subversion. Those are matters under the investigative jurisdiction of the NCIS. RSIs are requested and managed by the DoD CAF.
f. When adverse or questionable information is developed during a BI, regardless of type, the investigation is expanded to the extent necessary to substantiate or disprove the information. A personal interview of the subject will be conducted by the DCSA, when necessary, to resolve or clarify any information which may impute the subject's moral character, threaten the subject's future federal employment, raise the question of the subject's eligibility for security clearance, or be otherwise incriminating.
g. NAC. The NAC is an integral element of all BI and is the baseline for interim TS or interim SCI national security eligibility determinations. The NAC is a records checks of databases that includes the FBI Fingerprint (FP) check, FBI Name check, a list of previous investigations recorded in DCSA Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SSII), a Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) check, and a credit check. Checks such as Selective Service, Military Personnel Records, and State Department Passport Office are scheduled when certain conditions are met.
h. Advance NAC. The Advance NAC consists of an itemized list (generally FBI FP, FBI Name, DCSA's SSII and DCII checks) of the NAC results and search status.
i. FP Special Agreement Check. The FP Special Agreement Check (SAC) is an integral part of all initial investigations, and is conducted in conjunction with the submission of all initial BI and some reinvestigations. FP SACs will be electronically captured and submitted via the Secure Web FP Transmission portal.
j. Polygraph. Polygraph examinations may be used in PSIs under the conditions specified in and as stated in reference
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9 Enclosure (7) (n). No unfavorable national security eligibility determination will be taken based solely on a polygraph examination that is interpreted as indicating deception or is inconclusive. Refusal to take a voluntary polygraph will be given no consideration, favorable or unfavorable, when making a national security eligibility determination. Admissions made during the polygraph interview or attempts to employ countermeasures to defeat a polygraph may be considered when making a national security eligibility determination.
6. Investigative Requirements for Civilians in Sensitive Positions
a. A previously conducted Access National Agency Check with Inquiries (ANACI) or Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) satisfies federal civilian employment suitability requirements for sensitive duty assignment provided there has been no break in service exceeding 24 months; however, a previously conducted NACLC will not. A T3 or T5 is required for reappointment to a federal government sensitive position if there has been a break in service greater than 24 months.
b. Each civilian employee appointed under civil service procedures, including consultants and Intergovernmental Personnel Act employees, is subject to investigation to determine suitability for federal employment. Employees being reappointed are exempt from this requirement only if their break in employment is less than 24 months.
c. See reference (b) for more information.
d. Temporary Employment. A T3 is the minimum requirement for civilian summer hires in all designated non-critical sensitive positions including summer hires, intermittent and seasonal appointees, or work/study and cooperative education program employees. To the greatest extent possible, investigations requested to support sensitive duty assignment should be requested far enough in advance to allow completion and adjudication of the T3 prior to assignment. Any temporary, intermittent, summer hire, or seasonal employee who is granted national security eligibility must be 18 years of age or older on or before national security eligibility is granted. All waiver requests must be submitted to CNO, DNS, CMC, and HQMC PP&O/PS; and forwarded to DUSN (S&I) for consideration and
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10 Enclosure (7) submission to Director, Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security) (DDI (I&S)).
e. Emergency Appointments. If the appointee does not have the necessary investigative basis for appointment, he/she may be placed in a non-critical sensitive position only as an emergency measure after the CO determines that delay in appointment would be harmful to the national security (not to exceed 180 days), the T3 has been requested, favorable fingerprint result received, and a check of locally available records is favorable. The CO's justification for the emergency appointment will be recorded in writing. Commands must maintain a central file of all emergency appointments for review during security and personnel management evaluations. The record of emergency appointments will include:
(1) Identifying data on the appointee to include full name, social security number, date and place of birth, position or job title.
(2) Organizational location of the position.
(3) Position sensitivity and designation criterion.
(4) Certification and justification by the CO that emergency appointment is necessary. (In determining whether emergency appointment is justified, a delay in appointment may be considered harmful to the national security if regulatory requirements and mission-essential functions or responsibilities cannot be met, and no other cleared or otherwise qualified personnel are available on a temporary basis to do the work.)
(5) A statement that a check of locally available records was favorable.
(6) The date that the required BI was requested. For a critical-sensitive position, the record will also include the date of the T3 that formed the basis for emergency appointment.
(7) To keep emergency appointments to the absolute minimum, activities must anticipate the need to fill a sensitive position and request the required investigation sufficiently in advance of the desired date of appointment.
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11 Enclosure (7) (8) Additional investigative requirements for assignment to selected job series or duties are established and authorized by Section 5. Section 5 documents the requirements used for BI planning and budgeting.
(9) Mobilization. For the purpose of mobilizing selected civilian annuitants under reference (u) with a break in active service greater than 24 months, investigative requirements will be expedited or waived, depending on the sensitivity of the position. Priority will be afforded to mobilized reemployed annuitants being assigned to intelligence and security activities with respect to granting security clearances.
(10) U.S. Coast Guard. For the purposes of partial or full mobilization under provisions of reference (v). (Title 14 pertaining to the U.S. Coast Guard as an element of the DON), the requirement for a T3 upon reentry may be waived.
7. Investigative Requirements for DON Contractor Personnel
a. Investigative requirements for DON contractor personnel requiring access to classified information are managed under the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). Requests for investigation of contractor personnel for security clearance eligibility are processed by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) Vetting Risk Operations Center (VROC) and adjudicated by the VROC. When SCI access is at issue, reference (k) applies. The VROC and the DoD CAF are the adjudicative authority for all DON contractor personnel requiring SCI access eligibility.
b. Contracts involving sensitive duties and/or DON systems, should incorporate the security requirements specified herein to ensure applicable personnel security requirements are included in all contracts, agreements, memorandums of understanding, and other documents in accordance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations. Non-NISP adjudications for contract personnel are done by the requesting command, using reference (b).
c. Consultants hired by a DON Government Contracting Activity. A consultant who is individually hired by a DON command or activity, will work strictly at the command/activity,
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12 Enclosure (7) and requires access to classified information only at the command/activity, or in connection with authorized visits, will have security clearance eligibility established under this regulation. The consultant is considered for security clearance purposes as an employee of the DON command/activity and is investigated by DCSA and adjudicated by the DoD CAF, as appropriate.
8. Specific Duty or Assignment Requirements
a. The following specific duties are assigned minimum investigative or clearance requirements:
(1) ASM. The designated security manager of a command must have a favorably adjudicated T5 or T5R completed within the past five years.
(2) Personnel Security Clearance Adjudication Officials. Any person selected to serve with a board, committee, or other group responsible for adjudicating personnel security cases shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated T5, T5R completed within the past five years.
(3) Appellate Authorities. Persons selected to serve with a board, committee, or other group responsible for adjudicating appeals of personnel security determinations must have a favorably adjudicated T5 or T5R completed within the past five years.
(4) Educational and Training Programs. Persons selected for duties in connection with formal programs involving the education and training of military or civilian personnel must have a favorably adjudicated T3 or T3R prior to assignment. This requirement applies to those assigned to formal programs and does not include those incidentally involved in training. It does not apply to teachers or administrators associated with university extension courses conducted on DON installations in the U.S.
(5) Cryptographic Duties. Personnel assigned to cryptographic duties must have the appropriate security clearance eligibility established prior to accessing U.S. cryptographic information. Interim security clearances are not valid for access to U.S. cryptographic information.
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13 Enclosure (7) (6) Investigative Duties. Investigative agents and other personnel assigned to investigative agencies whose official duties require continuous access to investigative files and materials, require a favorably adjudicated T5 or T5R completed within the past five years.
(7) NAF. NAF employees assigned to positions of trust within DoD will be the subject of a favorably adjudicated Tier 1 (T1), (non-sensitive), investigation completed no greater than 24 months prior to appointment. A favorably completed prior investigation for Federal service which meets or exceeds the T1 standard will satisfy this requirement if there has not been a break in service greater than 24 months between Federal service and employment by NAF Instrumentalities. NAF employees requiring eligibility determination will be processed in accordance with reference (b). If access to a DON computer system and/or network is required, the position will be designated and the appropriate BI will be submitted in accordance with reference (b).
(8) American Red Cross/United Service Organization (U.S.O.). A favorably adjudicated T3 is required on American Red Cross or U.S.O. personnel as a prerequisite for assignment to activities overseas.
(9) Chemical Agents. Personnel whose duties involve access to or security of chemical agents require a favorably adjudicated T3 completed within the past five years before assignment.
(10) Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E). Personnel operating a vehicle or providing security to a vehicle transporting Category I, II, or Confidential AA&E require a favorably adjudicated T3 or T3R.
(11) Contract Guards. Contract guards require a favorably adjudicated T3 or T3R.
(12) Foreign Nationals Employed Overseas
(a) A non-U.S. citizen employed overseas, who provides support to national security positions and who does not require access to classified information, will be subject to the
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14 Enclosure (7) following record checks initiated (before employment) International, bi-lateral, or subsidiary agreements governing locally hired employees may require additional investigation. The minimum required checks are:
1. Host government law enforcement and security agency checks at the city, state (province), and national level whenever permissible by the laws of the host government and when practical, considering CI responsibilities in accordance with reference (b).
2. DoD-approved automated records checks.
3. FBI records (where information exists indicating residence by the non-U.S. citizen in the U.S. for one year or more since age 18).
(b) The commander assumes responsibility for permitting access to DoD systems, unclassified information, material, and areas when an investigation conducted by the host country does not meet the investigative standards of this regulation.
(c) The commander will allow access to unclassified information by a non-U.S. citizen only in accordance with applicable disclosure policies and when such access cannot cause significant or serious damage to U.S. national security.
(d) The commander may choose to include additional checks, as appropriate.
(13) Nuclear Weapon PRP. Reference (g) provides the standards of individual reliability required for personnel performing duties involving nuclear weapons and components. PRP requires commands to screen personnel before transferring them to training which leads to a PRP assignment. The investigative requirements for PRP assignment are based on the position designation. The PRP positions are designated as either critical or controlled.
(a) Critical PRP Position. The investigative requirement for initial assignment to a critical PRP position is a favorably adjudicated T5 completed within the past five years. A favorably adjudicated T5R may also satisfy this requirement.
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15 Enclosure (7) If there is no investigation to satisfy the requirement for initial assignment, the command must request an T5. A SSBI- PR/T5R is required every five years.
(b) Controlled PRP Position. The investigative requirement for initial assignment to a controlled PRP position is a favorably adjudicated T3 or T3R completed within the past five years. An existing favorably adjudicated SSBI or SSBI-PR completed within the past five years will also suffice. When there is no investigation to satisfy the requirements for initial assignment, the command must request a T3, as appropriate. When requesting a new investigation, the request must be properly annotated to reflect PRP assignment. A T3 or T3R is required every five years for continued PRP assignment.
b. In addition to the above specific duties, there are minimum investigative and citizenship requirements for assignment to specified facilities necessitated by the nature of the command mission and operational structure. These specific facility requirements are unrelated to specific duties and are enumerated and authorized by Section 5. Section 5 documents the requirements used for BI planning and budgeting.
c. If an individual requires different levels of investigations to accomplish differing assignments, request the greater investigation to satisfy all requirements.
9. Specific Program Requirements
a. Reference (b) establishes, to the extent possible, uniform and consistent personnel security investigative requirements. Accordingly, investigations exceeding established requirements are authorized only when mandated by statute, national regulations, or international agreement. In this regard, there are certain programs originating at the national or international level that require specific investigation and unique procedures. These programs are as follows:
(1) SAP. SAP are discussed in paragraph 1-7 and are established in DoD under SAP Oversight Committee authority. SAP requirements may include, but are not limited to, special clearance eligibility, additional adjudication, unique investigative requirements, material dissemination restrictions, and formal identification of
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16 Enclosure (7) personnel with need-to-know. These requirements are specifically determined by the SAP manager.
(2) SCI. The investigative requirement for access to SCI is a favorably adjudicated T5. A T5R is required to be submitted every five years. The requirements for SCI access are established under Director of National Intelligence authority. When military personnel are ordered to billets requiring SCI access, the transfer orders will identify the requirement. The losing command's ASM/SSO must ensure the required investigative requests are submitted promptly prior to transfer. If an individual is indoctrinated for SCI access, the CO may not administratively lower the individual's security clearance below the TS level without approval of the DoD CAF.
(3) Nuclear Command and Control-Extremely Sensitive Information (NC2-ESI). Investigative requirements for access to NC2-ESI information vary depending on whether the information to be accessed is SIOP or NC2-ESI.
(a) Access to NC2-ESI is based on need-to-know and requires security clearance eligibility commensurate with the classification of the information to be accessed.
(b) Access to NC2-ESI requires a TS security clearance eligibility based on a favorably adjudicated SSBI. The SSBI need not have been completed within the past five years to grant access to NC2-ESI, providing a new T5 or T5R is initiated within 30 days.
(4) PSA. Reference (o) prescribes the policies and procedures for the nomination, screening, selection, and continued evaluation of DON military and civilian personnel and contractor employees assigned to or used in PSA. There are two categories of PSA assignments, Category One and Category Two.
(a) Personnel nominated for Category One and Category Two duties must have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated SSBI completed within the 36 months preceding selection into Presidential Support duties.
(b) DON personnel in support of Presidential activities will be processed for expedited BI. The ASM will
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17 Enclosure (7) monitor JPAS or successor system and submit a request to the DoD CAF requesting expedited adjudication when the BI is closed.
(c) The U.S. citizenship of foreign-born immediate family members of all Presidential Support nominees must be verified by investigation. If the individual marries or cohabitates after completion of the T5, a spouse NAC must be requested.
(5) NATO. An equivalent level U.S. security clearance is the basis for access to NATO classified information. See reference (b) for more information.
(a) The investigative basis for a NATO staff position/billet is a favorably adjudicated T5, T5R, T3 or T3R, depending on the level of clearance and access the billet requires. The investigation must have been completed within the five years preceding the assignment. Continued assignment to a NATO COSMIC billet requires T5R every five years.
(b) For Navy military members under Permanent Change of Station (PCS) orders to NATO billets, detailers will coordinate with the Naval Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM) (PERS- 483) to ensure that investigations are properly completed. PERS-483 provides policy manuals to ensure that proper investigation requests are submitted for NATO billet candidates. Policy will specify that the command may not execute the PCS orders until specifically released to do so by PERS-483, after verification of investigation and coordination with the DCSA or the DoD CAF.
(c) Personnel not assigned to a NATO staff position, but requiring access to NATO information in the normal course of their duties, must possess the equivalent final U.S. national security eligibility based upon the appropriate PSI.
(d) Personnel assigned to NATO staff positions may submit reinvestigation requests up to one year in advance of the required timeframe.
(6) Wounded Warrior Security and Intelligence Internship Program.
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18 Enclosure (7) (a) PSIs in support of designated wounded Service Members may be submitted and processed regardless of the time remaining in service. Reinvestigations will be submitted in accordance with reference (b).
(b) Category 2 wounded, ill, or injured Service Members who expect to be separated with a medical disability rating of 30 percent or greater may submit investigative requests for TS or SCI eligibility before medical separation as long as they are serving in or have been nominated for a Wounded Warrior Internship Program.
(c) The investigations will be funded by the DoD office offering the internship. If the office offering the internship does not have funds available, the owning Military Department may choose to fund the investigation.
(d) Investigations submitted in support of Wounded Warrior Security and Intelligence Internship Program should:
1. Not request priority service.
2. Include the extra coverage code “WW” in Block B of the “Agency Use Only” section of the SF 86. This will expedite scheduling and completion of investigations submitted in support of the Wounded Warrior Security and Intelligence Internship Program.
3. Notify NBIB via e-mail to operationwarfighter@nbib.gov. Include the subject’s full name, the e-Application (e-App) request identification number, and the DoD POC should NBIB need additional information.
b. A listing of investigation and citizenship requirements for assignment to special programs is provided and authorized by reference (b). Reference (b) and Section 5 documents the requirements used for BI planning and budgeting.
c. This enclosure is not the governing policy for the programs listed in this paragraph. Consult the governing policy for a full description of program requirements.
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19 Enclosure (7) 10. Reciprocity and Acceptability of Previously Conducted Investigations
a. Investigations will not be duplicated when a previously conducted investigation meets the scope and standards for the level required. Previously conducted investigations by Federal Government agencies will be mutually and reciprocally accepted by the VROC and the DoD CAF.
b. Before initiating a new investigation, command security personnel will search JPAS and successor system or other linked automated investigative indices, such as JPAS Special Investigative Inquiry and the OPM Central Verification System, for evidence of a previously conducted investigation that meets requirements.
(1) If subject provides information regarding a previous investigation conducted by an agency other than DCSA, this information must be verified by the DoD CAF. Submit a request to DoD CAF via JPAS, or successor, advising of the adjudicative requirements, and provide the information regarding subject’s previous investigation. The DoD CAF will verify and respond regarding eligibility and investigative reciprocity.
(2) If no record is found of an equivalent investigation, a new investigation will be requested.
c. Adjudicative agencies and commands will not request previous investigative files for adjudicative review unless:
(1) The previous investigative file was never properly adjudicated.
(2) Potentially disqualifying information was developed since the last favorable adjudication.
(3) The most recent clearance or access authorization was conditional or based on a waiver.
(4) The individual is being considered for a higher level of clearance eligibility by the DoD CAF, or other official command program requirements.
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20 Enclosure (7) d. When DON personnel are assigned or detailed to other Federal agencies (e.g., DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, etc.), the entity exercising administrative jurisdiction will be responsible for initiating the required personnel security investigation. The completed investigation for all DON personnel will be forwarded to the DoD CAF for a security clearance eligibility determination.
e. Conversely, when it becomes necessary for a commanding officer to grant access to personnel from other military departments or DoD agencies who do not have the required security clearance eligibility, the DON command granting access will submit a request for investigation to DCSA indicating that the results are to be forwarded to the DoD CAF. The DoD CAF will be responsible for expeditiously transmitting results of the security clearance determination to the requestor.
f. Review of Prior Investigations. Prior BIs may only be requested for review in support of an official requirement.
(1) Official command requirements include higher level of special access, critical PRP positions, or assignment to higher level sensitive duties, acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces, or appointment or retention in civilian employment.
(2) All requests must be justified and forwarded to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency by following the "Pre-Placement" instructions outlined at the following link: https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/gov_hr_security/requesting_files/.
11. Limitations on Requests for Investigation
a. BIs for purposes other than allowed by this policy manual regulation are not authorized unless detailed justification has been submitted to CNO, DNS or CMC, HQMC PP&O/PS for endorsement and forwarded to DUSN (S&I) for consideration and submission to DDI (I&S).
b. Before requesting an investigation, activities must determine that the individual does not have an investigation that satisfies the requirements.
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21 Enclosure (7) c. Requests for BIs will not be submitted on any civilian or military personnel who will be retired, resigned, or separated with less than one-year service remaining.
12. Command Responsibilities in BI Requests
a. There are certain functions necessary to support an efficient BI process that is performed by the requesting command prior to submission of a BI request. The functions are as follows:
(1) Ensure the investigative requirements for military and civilian employees are accurately recorded in appropriate personnel systems. This data will be used for programming and to validate electronic BI requests.
(2) Local Records Check. Check locally available records at the command and provide relevant data to the ISP concerning the subject to include: e-App, electronic fingerprints (e-FP), and signed releases, as necessary. Security offices are not authorized to conduct investigations off of the installation or through the internet (i.e. courthouse records, credit checks, law enforcement checks). Local record checks will be retained on file until final eligibility is determined. A review of local civilian law enforcement records, the National Crime Information Center, and the servicing NCIS office is prohibited.
(3) Validate Citizenship. For individuals who are born outside the U.S., extra coverage codes will be entered on the investigative request forms to ensure NBIB accomplishes the citizenship validation in accordance with national standards. Commands (Human Resource Office) will also validate citizenship of individuals before submitting initial BI requests. (Only U.S. citizens are eligible for security clearance or assignment to a sensitive national security position).
(4) Verify Date and Place of Birth and Education. When requesting an T5 or T5R, commands will attempt to validate subject's date and place of birth through review of available personnel records. However, for education verification, extra coverage codes will be entered on investigative request forms to
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22 Enclosure (7) ensure DCSA accomplishes the education validation in accordance with T5 standards. This is not necessary when requesting a T3 or T3R.
(5) Ensure the investigation request is completed and prepared using current guidance to preclude rejection by DCSA. Current directions for completing investigation requests can be found at the DUSN (S&I) website, https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/Pages/default.aspx.
b. Document efforts to validate and verify the required information, where appropriate.
c. Pre-Screening Interview
(1) Before a request for a T5 for SCI access is submitted to DCSA, the nominee must undergo a pre-screening interview. Unfavorable information developed during the pre- screening interview that is not fully explained in the applicable remarks sections of the SF 86, will be explained in a written report that identifies the interviewer and is attached to the T5 submission. Note: Individuals who are in or selected for command status. (CO/Executive Officer) do not require a pre-screening interview.
(2) Questions pertaining to an individual's sexual orientation are not permitted on personnel security questionnaires, supplemental questionnaires, or screening forms, therefore will not be asked during subject pre-screening interviews.
13. BI Request Forms
a. E-QIP. E-Qip or successor application is the federal government standard automated request tool for BI. E-QIP or successor application are a part of the e-government, e- clearance initiative sponsored by the NBIB. E-QIP or successor applications allows applicants to electronically enter, update, and transmit their personal investigation data over a secure Internet connection to their employing agency or security management office for review and approval in conjunction with the BI request.
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23 Enclosure (7) b. SF 86, “Questionnaire for National Security Positions.” The SF 86 is the currently approved method of requesting BI products from DCSA to support determinations of eligibility for assignment to sensitive national security positions or access to classified NSI. The subject of the investigation completes the SF 86 electronically. The Agency Use information and the release forms are imbedded in the SF 86. Requesting commands must electronically submit fingerprints with each request, except for the T5R/T3R via Secure Web Fingerprint Transmission (SWFT) portal. Access to SWFT can be obtained from the Navy’s Echelon I or II security offices, HQMC PP&O/PS, or Marine Corps COs. Hard copy submission is available using the SF 87 for all DON employee/applicant, military, volunteers as well as contractors until connection to the SWFT is obtained.
14. Preparation and Submission of Investigation Requests
a. The NBIB Federal Investigative Services Division (FISD) will accept BIs submitted electronically via e-QIP or successor system using the approved Standard Forms: SF 86, and the SF 86A, Continuation Sheet for Questionnaires. Use the SF 86A when additional space for documentation is required.
b. Directions for completing, preparing, and transmitting BI requests forms are on the DUSN (S&I) web page at: https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/Pages/default.aspx. It’s very important to follow request directions precisely, especially the directions regarding the “Agency Use” coding, as failure to properly code request will result in returned requests.
(1) Use the assigned Submitting Office Number (SON) and Submitting Office Identifier (SOI):
(a) The SON is authorized to obtain information on the case status of a BI. For the purpose of creating a new SON, the PIPS Form 12, SON Creation and Amendment Form is submitted to DUSN (S&I) via CNO, DNS or CMC, HQMC PP&O/PS for approval and submission to OPM. For the purpose of amendment to the SON, the PIPS Form 12 is submitted to OPM via CNO or CMC.
(b) The Navy Echelon I and II and HQMC PP&O/ASM is authorized an SOI until an automated solution is developed to receive advance fingerprint results and case closing transmittal reports via JPAS or successor system. The Navy Echelon I and II and HQMC PP&O/ASM can add additional users as required to
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24 Enclosure (7) identify the appropriate official who will receive case results, data, or other information from DCSA. Security offices employees may contact the DCSA to obtain detailed information about a case. Approved employees are the only individuals who may receive information by telephone or secure e-mail. For the purpose of creating a new SOI, the PIPS Form 11, SOI Creation and Amendment Form is submitted to DUSN (S&I) via CNO, DNS or CMC, HQMC PP&O/PS for approval and submission to DCSA.
(2) The subject of each BI will provide their personal information as required by DCSA. At a minimum, the subject will:
(a) Provide accurate and complete data as part of the investigation.
(b) Complete the appropriate investigative forms through e-App and e-FP capture devices.
(c) Execute signed releases, as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education, employment, and medical and similar records to provide relevant record information to the NBIB.
15. Prioritizing Investigation Requests
a. The DCSA is the ISP for all DoD BIs. DCSA offers fee for service products with additional costs for priority processing. The DON centrally funds the PSP, and has allocated resources for the following:
(1) Standard Service T5 for critical sensitive positions, TS security clearance, and SCI access determinations. Use service code “70.”
(2) Standard Service T5R for reinvestigating personnel in critical sensitive positions, requiring TS security clearance eligibility and SCI access. Use service code “71.”
(3) Standard Service T3/T3R for initial Secret and Confidential security clearance, military accessions and for reinvestigation of all personnel with Secret and Confidential security clearance. Use service code “64” and reinvestigation code “65.”
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25 Enclosure (7) (4) Standard Service T3/T3R for civilians assigned to non-critical sensitive positions and for initial Secret and Confidential security clearance determinations. Use service code “64” and reinvestigation code “65.”
b. DCSA will only process requests using the service codes listed above as the DON has not authorized funding to conduct "Expedited" or "Priority" service investigations. Requests forwarded with unauthorized service codes will be returned or rejected.
c. If a mission critical requirement exists for other than standard service, DUSN (S&I) can negotiate priority processing for requests with DCSA.
(1) Requests that justify priority processing expense are those in which the subject of the investigation cannot perform assigned duties until the investigation is completed and adjudicated. The vast majority of positions and duties can be performed on an interim or temporary basis while awaiting the results of investigation, so the Departmental requirements for priority processing are minimal.
(2) Navy commands may request priority processing authorization via their Echelon I or II ASM, contact DUSN (S&I) at donsecurity_pers.fct@navy.mil for review and approval. You must cite the policy requirement that prevents use of interim access or assignment to perform assigned duties and necessitates priority service expenditures. Requests for priority processing of Marine Corps investigations will be submitted via HQMC PP&O/PS at (703) 614-2320 or DSN 224-2320 and forwarded to DUSN (S&I) for review and approval at the above e-mail address.
16. Maintaining Questionnaire Information
a. A tickler copy of the above requests will be locally retained, to include copies of the completed questionnaire, to enable future tracer actions. Commands must ensure appropriate protection of completed questionnaires and will ensure copies are destroyed when DoD CAF adjudicative action is complete.
b. Requesting an individual to prepare a questionnaire for BI purposes using either electronic questionnaires or paper forms constitutes solicitation of personal information that is
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26 Enclosure (7) protected by reference (u). COs have a responsibility to ensure that the information provided by the individual receives the appropriate protection.
c. If an individual refuses to provide or permit access to relevant information for investigation purposes, after being advised of the effect of refusal, commands will terminate the BI request process and notify the DCSA or the DoD CAF via JPAS or successor system. The individual will not be eligible for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties unless the information is made available. Personnel indoctrinated for SCI access will be debriefed for cause.
17. Follow-Up Actions on Investigative Requests
a. Rejection of Investigation Requests. When an investigation request is rejected by DCSA because the request was not properly prepared, commands must take immediate corrective action and resubmit the request. All forms being resubmitted and the tickler copy of the request form will be annotated with the resubmission date. If a military subject has been transferred, the rejected BI request must be forwarded immediately to the gaining command for correction and resubmission.
b. Request Follow-up. Commands are required to monitor requested investigations to ensure they are initiated, completed, and adjudicated as required. JPAS or its successor provides the status of investigations and should be consulted within 30 days of submission of request to ensure the request is initiated and opened by the ISP. If JPAS or its successor reflects the investigation is still pending, query DCSA for status. If JPAS or its successor reflects the investigation closed within the last three months and the adjudication decision has not been received, a query to the DoD CAF is appropriate.
c. Cancellation of Investigation Requests. When an investigation is in a pending status and the subject is being released from active duty, discharged, is resigning, or circumstances permanently change to negate the need for the investigation, the command will notify the DoD CAF immediately. The DoD CAF will direct DCSA, as appropriate, to cancel the investigation.
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27 Enclosure (7) 18. Processing Completed Reports of Investigation
a. All BIs requested to support eligibility determinations on DON employees are forwarded to the DoD CAF, when completed, for adjudication. The DoD CAF will make the required eligibility determination based on the requirements identified on the BI request.
(1) When the BI contains information that requires expansion, adjudication of the BI will be held in abeyance pending completion of the additional investigative leads. Interim access may not continue in these situations.
(2) Initial investigations on civilians or non-DoD personnel supporting unclassified contracts that uncover suitability issues are forwarded to the HRO for civilian employment and to the ASM on non-DoD personnel supporting unclassified contracts for the appropriate suitability determination. After the suitability determination is made, the completed Investigation (INV) Form 79A, Report of Agency Adjudicative Action on DCSA Personnel Investigations must be returned to the DCSA.
(3) The ASM will consult JPAS or successor system to determine when investigations are completed and when the DoD CAF adjudication is concluded. The ASM must ensure they have properly in-processed the person under their Security Management Office control in JPAS or successor system so they receive pertinent information and notices from the DoD CAF.
b. The DoD CAF adjudicates investigations requested to support trustworthiness determinations and non-sensitive position assignments that can be favorably adjudicated. The DoD CAF forwards unfavorable investigations to submitting office number for the appropriate trustworthiness and suitability determinations.
19. Safeguarding Reports of Investigation
a. In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security reports and records, particularly with regard to personal privacy, results of investigations must be handled with the highest degree of discretion. Any investigative material,
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28 Enclosure (7) favorable or unfavorable, must be handled, stored, and transmitted using the following safeguards:
(1) Investigative reports will be made available only to those authorities that require access in the performance of their official duties for the purposes of determining eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment to sensitive duties; acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces; appointment or retention in civilian employment; or for law enforcement and counterintelligence purposes.
(2) BIs will not be made available for, or communicated to, selecting officials. For any other uses, specific written approval must be obtained from DDI (I&S) via DUSN (S&I) from CNO or CMC.
(3) Reproduction of investigative reports is restricted to the minimum required for the performance of official duties. All copies of BIs will be destroyed as soon as final action is taken.
(4) Retention of copies of BIs longer than 120 days after final action has been completed must be specifically approved, in writing, by the investigating agency.
(5) Investigative reports will be stored in a vault, safe, or steel filing cabinet having at least a lockbar, an approved three-position dial type combination padlock, or in a similarly protected container or area.
(6) Reports of investigation may not be shown or released to the subject of the investigation without the specific approval of the investigating agency. Under no circumstances will reports of investigation be placed in the subject's personnel record or any record to which the subject may have access.
(7) When being transmitted by mail, or carried by persons not authorized to receive these reports, reports of investigations must be sealed in double envelopes or covers. The inner container will bear a notation that it is to be opened only by an official designated to receive reports of BIs.
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29 Enclosure (7) (8) If the results of an investigation are received after the subject has been transferred within DON, the transferring command will forward the results to the gaining command, as appropriate.
b. Results of DCSA investigations may not be released outside DoD without the specific approval of DCSA.
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Enclosure (8) ADJUDICATION AND ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
1. Overview
a. PSIs are conducted to gather information for two purposes; to meet OPM requirements for accomplishing employment suitability determinations and to satisfy Executive Branch requirements for making personnel security eligibility determinations.
b. After determining the position sensitivity level, the appropriate investigation can be requested.
c. Upon completion, the investigation is adjudicated to determine suitability and security eligibility. The focus of suitability adjudication is to determine whether the employment of an individual can reasonably be expected to promote the efficiency of the service. The focus of a personnel security adjudication is whether the assignment or continued assignment in a sensitive position, or authorization for access to classified information, can reasonably be expected to be clearly consistent with the interest of national security.
d. Employment suitability adjudications are based on standards and criteria established by reference (q), and are normally made by the employing command. Personnel security determinations are based on criteria established by reference (b) are made by the DoD CAF, as provided in paragraph 6-1. Only U.S. citizens are eligible for security clearance and require eligibility to execute official U.S. government functions and duties (including employees of contractors under the NISP).
e. Use the following legend to complete the e-QIP Agency Use Block for proper routing of the SF 86 to the DoD CAF:
(1) DoD Suitability. Used by Human Resource professionals to submit civilians for suitability investigations.
(2) DoD Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12. Used by security professionals for contractors in support of unclassified contracts requiring physical and/or logical access.
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2 Enclosure (8) (3) DON submission for National Security Positions. Used by security professionals for all civilian, military, and contractor personnel who occupy a National Security position or require access to classified information.
(4) ASM and Human Resource personnel are required to obtain access to DISS or successor system to communicate with the DoD CAF, to receive notifications of investigation status, submit customer service requests (CSRs) and to validate fingerprint results. Access to DISS or successor system is available by contacting the Echelon I, II, or HQMC PP&O/PS security offices. DISS CSRs and Preconditions Overview can be obtained on the DUSN (S&I) website at https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/Pages/default.aspx.
f. NBIB forwards all completed PSIs for DON personnel to the DoD CAF. The DCSA and the DoD CAF are delegated the authority in the DoD to make de facto security determinations on investigations closed without actionable issues on national security cases. In cases without issue, a favorable security determination equates to a favorable suitability determination. All other (non-sensitive) investigations on civilian personnel must be adjudicated by the HRO and the ASM for non-NISP contractors for suitability in accordance with reference (b). The following workflow procedures have been established to accomplish this requirement:
(1) When the INV Form 79A indicates "No Actionable Issue," the investigation will not normally be returned to the requesting command. A favorable security determination on a "No Actionable Issue" case will result in an automatic favorable suitability determination. The DoD CAF will favorably adjudicate the investigation, as appropriate, and enter the favorable determination in JPAS or successor system, thus notifying the command of the favorable determination. The DoD CAF will complete the INV Form 79A accordingly and forward it to OPM Federal Investigative Services Division (FISD).
(2) Investigations for non-sensitive or public trust positions will be forwarded to the command for the suitability determination. The INV Form 79A indicates "Actionable Issues," the completed investigation, with the OPM Certification of Investigation and INV Form 79A, will be forwarded to the requesting command for a suitability determination for civilian
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3 Enclosure (8) employees to the HRO and the ASM for non-NISP contractor. If the requesting command makes a favorable suitability determination, it will be indicated in the applicable blocks on the INV Form 79A and will be returned to OPM to enter the results in the Clearance Verification System. The ASM or HRO as the Component Adjudicator will enter the results in the DISS. If the suitability determination made by the command is unfavorable, it remains a personnel action and no DoD CAF action is required.
g. Adjudicative determinations, whether favorable or unfavorable, interim or final, will be entered into the DISS on the same day the determination is made.
2. Security Adjudication Criteria
a. The national security adjudication criteria used to determine security clearance eligibility will likewise be applied by the DCSA, VROC, and the DoD CAF to make determinations of eligibility to occupy a sensitive national security position. Assignment to sensitive positions is not authorized for individuals who have received an unfavorable clearance eligibility determination until the VROC or the DoD CAF reestablishes the eligibility.
b. Because the same standards, criteria, and procedures are applied to both security clearance and sensitive position eligibility adjudications, a determination by the VROC or the DoD CAF that an individual is not eligible for assignment to sensitive duties will also result in the removal of clearance eligibility whether or not the individual requires a clearance to perform sensitive duties. Likewise, a determination by the VROC or the DoD CAF that an individual is not eligible for access to classified information will also result in a determination of ineligibility to occupy a sensitive position. National security eligibility determinations are a function distinct from granting access to classified NSI.
c. The personnel security adjudicative process evaluates investigative and other related information. It does not determine criminal guilt or general suitability for a given position. It assesses past behavior as a basis for predicting the individual's future trustworthiness and potential fitness for a sensitive position that, if improperly executed, could
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4 Enclosure (8) impact national security.
d. BIs may be adjudicated by e-adjudication using DNI- approved business rules, by certified adjudicators who have successfully completed the standards for experience, training, and certification to perform final adjudicative determinations, or by non-certified adjudicators operating under an approved risk management plan in accordance with reference (b).
e. All military positions are national security positions regardless whether or not the Service Member requires access to classified information and;
(1) All military members will undergo PRs, maintain a favorable eligibility, and be subject to continuous evaluation.
(2) All military members will undergo the T3 investigation at a minimum. The DoD CAF will adjudicate all military investigations and reinvestigations using the national security adjudicative guidelines.
(3) Military members who are denied or revoked a favorable national security eligibility determination will be afforded due process. Those individuals will be immediately referred to the servicing Military Department for appropriate action.
(4) Military members who are determined to be ineligible for access to classified material solely because of citizenship will be entered into JPAS as not eligible for access to classified material.
f. With the exception of military personnel, minors who are under the age of 18 will not be investigated nor granted national security eligibility.
g. All reliable information relevant to determining whether a person meets the national security eligibility standards is reviewed and evaluated by appropriately trained adjudicative personnel, in accordance with appropriate procedures approved by the Security Executive Agent. Final adjudication determinations
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5 Enclosure (8) will be made by certified adjudicators, non-certified adjudicators operating under an approved risk management plan, or in accordance with approved automated procedures.
h. The prohibitions on security clearance eligibility imposed by the “Bond Amendment” and explained in paragraph 8-3 will likewise be considered to prohibit assignment to sensitive, SAPs, Restricted Data (RD), or SCI national security positions in accordance with Section 3343 of reference (u).
i. Emergency Appointments. In cases where a command must hire an individual prior to completion of an investigation for suitability or security determination, emergency appointment procedures contained in Section 5 apply.
3. Eligibility Determinations
a. No individual will be given access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties unless a favorable personnel security determination has been made regarding his/her loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting them with access to classified information or assignment to a sensitive position is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. A PSI is conducted, as detailed in Section 5, to gather information pertinent to these determinations.
b. In making personnel security eligibility determinations, all information, favorable and unfavorable, is considered and assessed for accuracy, completeness, relevance, importance, and overall significance.
c. The eligibility determination is the result of an overall common sense "whole person" adjudication, reached by application of the evaluation criteria in reference (b). The criteria are based on reference (b) requirements and applies to all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, and other individuals who require access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
d. The DoD CAF establishes eligibility for all DON affiliated civilian and military personnel, after adjudication
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6 Enclosure (8) of the prerequisite security investigation. The DoD CAF reestablishes eligibility after adjudication of each subsequent investigation. In the interest of efficiency, the DoD CAF establishes eligibility at the highest level supportable by the prerequisite security investigation.
e. Once established, eligibility remains valid provided the individual continues compliance with personnel security standards and has no subsequent break in service exceeding 24 months.
f. Eligibility does not expire and is not invalidated by overdue reinvestigation.
g. When national security eligibility has been issued by another Federal agency, the security manager will submit a customer service request to the DoD CAF for re-certification of eligibility: the investigative agency, case number, date of investigation, and any other relevant information, so that DoD CAF may review and/or reissue national security eligibility, as applicable.
h. The personnel security adjudicative process evaluates investigative and other related information. It does not determine criminal guilt or the general suitability for a given position. It assesses past behavior as a basis for predicting the individual's future trustworthiness and potential fitness for a sensitive position that, if improperly executed, could have unacceptable consequences to national security.
i. Unless there is a reasonable basis for doubting a person's loyalty to the Government of the U.S., decisions regarding appointment or retention in civilian employment or acceptance or retention in the Navy and Marine Corps are governed by personnel policies not under the purview of this regulation.
4. Security Clearance and Sensitive Duty Assignment
a. In making eligibility determinations, the DoD CAF apply the personnel security eligibility adjudication standard consistently to both sensitive national security position determinations and security clearance eligibility determinations. These determinations cannot be made exclusive
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7 Enclosure (8) of each other. A determination that an individual is not eligible for assignment to a sensitive national security position will also result in the removal of eligibility for security clearance. Likewise, a determination that an individual is not eligible for a security clearance will result in the denial of eligibility for assignment to a sensitive national security position.
b. Security clearance eligibility is not de facto authorization for an individual to access classified information. Authorization to access classified information is a separate command level determination dependent on whether an individual who has the requisite eligibility also has a need for access to classified information in the performance of official duties.
c. A favorable sensitive duty assignment eligibility determination by the DoD CAF does not mandate the employing command to make such assignment. Rather it establishes that an employee has been determined to be eligible for such assignment based on national security standards, depending on the operational needs and the suitability requirements of the employing activity.
d. As the PSP has evolved, the terminology used to refer to program concepts has also evolved.
(1) The term “security clearance eligibility” has replaced “security clearance,” when referring to a formal determination made by an authorized adjudicative entity that an individual meets national security standards. Security clearance eligibility is officially recorded and subject to due process procedures. Security clearance now refers to a state that exists whenever eligibility has been properly established by an authorized adjudicative entity and access has been properly authorized by the command. Security clearance is understood to exist at the level of access authorized.
(2) When a command authorizes access to classified information pending completion and formal adjudication of the required PSI, this action was termed “interim clearance” in the past. However, reference (b) standards more accurately refer to this action as “temporary access” because it is an access determination under command purview. It is not a clearance
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8 Enclosure (8) determination and it carries no due process benefits. Detailed guidance for temporary access is provided in paragraph 9-4.
5. DoD CAF Determination Process
a. To ensure uniform application of the national security standards, the DoD CAF is the DoD authority for granting personnel security adjudication.
b. The DoD CAF adjudications eligibility to access classified information or perform sensitive duties for DON civilian and military personnel, at the request of commands and activities, upon affirmation that establishing the eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
c. The adjudication process assesses the probability of future behavior that could have an adverse effect on national security. Few situations allow for positive, conclusive evidence of certain future conduct, therefore, the adjudicative process is an attempt to judge whether the circumstances of a particular case of demonstrated past conduct, behaviors, and activities suggest a probable degree of future conduct, behavior or activities which would be inconsistent with the interests of national security.
d. DoD CAF adjudicators weigh each case on its unique merits, making common sense evaluations of the “whole person,” with consideration for the nature and seriousness of past conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct; the frequency and recency of the conduct; the age of the individual; the voluntariness of participation; and the absence or presence of rehabilitation by applying the adjudication criteria provided in reference (b).
e. In determining eligibility, DoD CAF adjudicators evaluate all available favorable and unfavorable information from personnel security investigative files and from other sources, including personnel, medical, legal, law enforcement, and security records.
(1) BIs are reviewed to ensure compliance with reference (b) standards. Investigations that do not meet reference (b) standards are returned to OPM for correction.
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9 Enclosure (8) (2) If investigative limitations preclude compliance with reference (b) standards, the DoD CAF may permit adjudication of the deviant investigation at its discretion and considering the needs of the DON, provided the investigative coverage is substantially sufficient to support the adjudication.
(a) Whenever an eligibility determination is based on an investigation that does not meet reference (b) standards, the deviation of standards will be recorded in JPAS or successor system.
(b) Reciprocity does not apply to eligibility determinations made with a deviation of investigative standards.
f. Although it is intended to rarely occur, considering the needs of the service, the DoD CAF may permit an affirmative eligibility determination when disqualifying issues have not been fully mitigated. There are two circumstances in which this exception to reference (b) adjudication criteria could occur, and both must be recorded in JPAS or successor system.
(1) Conditional exception. Eligibility may be authorized or continued by DoD CAF when disqualifying issues are present, with the provision that one or more additional compensatory measures be fulfilled. These measures or “conditions” will be fully defined to the individual concerned and the employing command, with the understanding that failure to fulfill the conditions will result in revocation of national security eligibility. Conditional eligibility determinations are usually reserved for situations in which the employee has exceptional skill or merit or has made exceptional contribution to the DON mission, and the employing activity is willing to provide the necessary resources to manage the defined risk and conditions. The security manager will monitor the individuals granted eligibility on conditions and report results to the DoD CAF semi-annually until the conditions are removed.
(2) Waiver exception. SCI access eligibility may be established or continued despite the presence of substantial issue information that would normally preclude access, such as the existence of foreign national family members. The waiver typically involves one specific disqualifying factor, which is waived due to meritorious circumstances. Reference (b) provides
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10 Enclosure (8) guidance on SCI access eligibility standards and waivers. The DoD CAF records “Bond Amendment” waivers in JPAS or successor system.
g. In the interest of efficiency, the DoD CAF adjudicators establish eligibility at the highest level supportable by the prerequisite investigation. The DoD CAF adjudicators reestablish eligibility after adjudication of each subsequent investigation.
h. All DoD CAF eligibility determinations are recorded in the JPAS or successor system on a daily basis.
i. The rationale underlying each unfavorable personnel security determination and each favorable personnel security determination (where the investigation or information upon which the determination was made included significant derogatory information as outlined in reference (b)) is documented and maintained in a readily retrievable system. In the case of favorable determinations, whenever a case has information that could reasonably be concluded differently by another adjudicator, a rationale must be maintained.
6. Requesting Eligibility Determinations
a. A personnel security eligibility determination is required when an individual is initially nominated to perform sensitive national security duties or for access to classified information; a PSI is completed on an individual who occupies a sensitive position or has access to classified information; unfavorable information becomes available about an individual who occupies a sensitive position or has access to classified information; or the issues that prompted a previous unfavorable personnel security eligibility determination no longer exist and the command again requires the individual to perform sensitive duties or to have access to classified information.
b. When it is determined that an individual will require access to classified information to perform assigned duties, commands will consult JPAS to determine if the necessary security clearance eligibility was previously established. If it appears that the prerequisite investigation was completed but not properly adjudicated, or if eligibility was established by an adjudicative entity other than DoD CAF, the command will use
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11 Enclosure (8) the CSR in DISS or successor system to request the DoD CAF reciprocally establish the required eligibility.
c. When the individual indicates that eligibility was established by a non-DoD entity, that eligibility determination may not be visible in JPAS or its successor. The command will gather details concerning the eligibility and investigation, and using DISS will request that DoD CAF “reciprocally” establish the required eligibility. Paragraph 7-7 provides details on reciprocal acceptance of eligibility determinations. The DoD CAF will either verify eligibility and reciprocally re-establish eligibility, or will direct the command to request the necessary PSI, as appropriate.
d. When it is determined that the individual does not have the investigation or eligibility required, the command will submit the appropriate request for investigation. Upon completion, the investigation will be forwarded to the DoD CAF where the required eligibility determination will be made and recorded in JPAS. Commands need NOT submit a separate eligibility request to the DoD CAF. The DoD CAF acts on the eligibility requirements recorded on the PSI request. For detailed instruction on the proper preparation of investigation request forms see the DUSN (S&I) website at https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/orgs/DUSNP/Security- Directorate/Personnel-Security/SitePages/Home.aspx/. Temporary access (interim clearance) procedures may be employed as necessary; refer to reference (b) for details.
e. Upon receipt of derogatory information, COs will determine whether, on the basis of all the facts, to suspend or limit an individual's access to classified information, or reassign the individual to non-sensitive duties pending a final eligibility determination by the DoD CAF. Paragraph 9-17 provides guidance on suspending access for cause. Regardless of the local access determination, commands must report all information, per Section 10 and reference (b), to the DoD CAF via the JPAS (or successor system) incident report function, and use other available means to forward relevant supporting documentation. The DoD CAF adjudicates the information and may validate continued eligibility, request more information, further investigation, or begin the unfavorable determinations process.
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12 Enclosure (8) 7. Reciprocal Acceptance of Eligibility Determinations
a. A personnel security eligibility determination by the DoD CAF, or another federal government agency, will not be duplicated when those investigations meet the scope and standards for the level of national security eligibility required. A previously granted national security eligibility or access may be re-certified in the DISS or successor system by the DoD CAF if:
(1) There is no break in continuous service greater than 24 months.
(2) Investigative basis is adequate for the eligibility to be established, and no new derogatory information is identified. Eligibility will be verified by the DoD CAF, without additional adjudication.
(3) Continuous service for eligibility purposes is active duty military service (including attendance at the military academies); active status in the military reserve, National Guard, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, active Individual Ready Reserves (IRR), etc., civilian employment in the federal government; employment with a DoD contractor that involves a security clearance eligibility under the NISP, or a combination of these. Continuous service is maintained with a change from one status to another as long as there is no break greater than 24 months. Retired status does not qualify as continuous service.
(4) Derogatory information includes any un-adjudicated information as outlined in reference (b).
b. Whenever security clearance eligibility has been established, the DoD CAF will not request prior investigative files for review unless:
(1) Potentially disqualifying information is developed since the last favorable adjudication.
(2) The individual is being considered for a higher level security clearance eligibility.
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13 Enclosure (8) (3) The most recent eligibility determination was conditional or based on a waiver or deviation.
c. Eligibility determinations established with waiver, deviation, or condition are not bound by reciprocity rules. Subparagraph’s 7-4.5 and 7-4.6 provide details on adjudications made as exception to rules.
d. Unfavorable personnel security eligibility determinations are not bound by reciprocity, but may also be accepted by agencies of the federal government, at their discretion.
8. Eligibility Prohibitions
a. Only U.S. citizens who are employees of the executive branch of the U.S. Government (including employees of contractors under the NISP) are eligible for security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties.
(1) Occasionally, it is necessary for the DON to authorize access or assignment for persons not meeting these requirements, per reference (b).
(2) When this regulation refers to U.S. citizens, it makes no distinction between those who are U.S. citizens by birth, those who are U.S. nationals, and those who have derived U.S. citizenship or those who acquired it through naturalization.
(3) For security clearance eligibility purposes, a U.S. citizen is a person born in one of the 50 U.S., Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, or Panama Canal Zone (if the father or mother (or both) is or was a citizen of the U.S.).
b. Eligibility will not be established for persons who are not in a position which requires eligibility including persons in non-sensitive or public trust civilian positions; persons (such as guards and emergency service personnel) who may only have inadvertent access to sensitive information or areas; persons (such as maintenance, food services, or cleaning personnel) who perform non-sensitive, unclassified duties in areas where classified information can be reasonably prevented;
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14 Enclosure (8) or persons (such as vendors and other commercial sales or service personnel) who do not require access to classified information and whose access to classified information can be prevented by a cleared escort. Reference (p) guidance is used for trustworthiness determinations for contractor personnel with no access to classified information.
c. Eligibility will not be established for identified persons commonly referred to as the “Bond Amendment,”. This mandate was enacted to preclude the initial granting or renewal of security clearance eligibility by the DoD under specific circumstances. The DoD CAF will determine applicability of Bond Amendment after adjudication of the prerequisite PSI. Bond Amendment waiver provisions and details are provided in reference (b).
d. Elected members of Congress are not processed for security clearance eligibility. They may be granted access to classified information as required for the performance of their duties. Procedures for visits by elected members of Congress requiring access to classified information are provided in paragraph 11-4.
e. Members of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal judiciary, and the Supreme Courts of the individual states are not processed for security clearance eligibility. They may be granted access to classified information to the extent necessary to adjudicate assigned cases. For SCI, access may be granted upon concurrence from Fleet Cyber or SSO Navy in accordance with reference (k). Section 9 provides access procedures.
9. Unique Eligibility Requirements
a. CO Clearance. Every CO must have a favorably adjudicated T5 or T5R and eligibility determination that is at least equivalent to the highest level of classified information maintained at the command.
(1) The incumbent CO will review the records of the prospective CO to ensure that the individual has the necessary investigation and clearance eligibility determination to assume command. In the absence of an incumbent CO, the next senior in the chain of command will ensure the records are reviewed.
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15 Enclosure (8) (2) When the prospective CO does not have an adjudicated SSBI/SSBI-PR/PPR/T5 or T5R completed within the past five years, the incumbent CO will ensure that the required T5 or T5R request is submitted.
b. Cryptographic Duties. Commands cannot grant interim access for cryptographic duties. The DoD CAF must establish clearance eligibility before access is allowed to U.S. cryptographic information.
c. Reserve Personnel. Navy and Marine Corps reserve personnel in an "active status" are considered to have continuous service and may be granted access as necessary, when supported by the commensurate DoD CAF security clearance eligibility.
d. IRR. IRR members will have security clearance eligibility established by the DoD CAF as necessary. All due process procedures will be afforded IRR members nominated for security clearance. The ASM must maintain an owning or servicing relationship in JPAS or successor system.
e. Rating/Military Operations Specialty Requirements. To maintain mobility and operational readiness, the NAVPERSCOM (PERS-483) or CMC HQMC must ensure individuals have security clearance eligibility established by the DoD CAF to support potential subsequent assignments. The ASM must maintain an owning or servicing relationship in JPAS or successor system.
(1) Commands will use the continuous evaluation and vetting processes to maintain security clearance eligibility for military members. All military members will undergo PRs, maintain a favorable adjudication and eligibility, and be subject to continuous evaluation and continuous vetting procedures.
(2) Commands will forward credible derogatory information from any source including but not limited to, an incident report, continuous evaluation alert, or a BI to the DoD CAF for determination of continued eligibility for security clearance, as appropriate.
f. Personnel Assigned to Other Federal Agencies. The DoD CAF will establish and provide certification of security
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16 Enclosure (8) clearance eligibility for DON employees assigned to other Federal agencies.
g. Access by Consultants to a Command or Activity. An individual who is direct-hired as a consultant by a government contracting office/activity and will only require access to classified information at that activity or in connection with authorized visits, is not processed for a security clearance under the NISP.
(1) For eligibility and access purposes, the consultant is managed by the contracting activity as an employee and the DoD CAF adjudicates eligibility.
(2) Consultants hired by (or under contract to) a DoD contractor to provide professional or technical assistance are considered employees of the contractor and are processed under the NISP if eligibility is required.
h. Members of congressional staffs may be processed for security clearance eligibility, as necessary, through the Security Division, Washington Headquarters Services in accordance with reference (b).
i. State governors may be processed for security clearance eligibility by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). COs may grant access to specifically designated classified information to these individuals on a "need-to-know" basis. Staff personnel of the governor's office who require access to DON classified information are investigated and vetted by the DHS, as appropriate.
10. Eligibility Under the NISP
a. Employees of contractors granted facility clearances under the NISP may have personnel security clearance eligibility established when there is a bona fide requirement to access classified information in connection with performance on a classified contract or R&D program. Contractor personnel security investigations are conducted by DCSA and the results are forwarded to the VROC, the DoD adjudicative facility responsible for establishing security clearance eligibility for DoD contractors.
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17 Enclosure (8) b. Employees of contractors requiring access to DON SCI are adjudicated for SCI access eligibility by the VROC or the DoD CAF.
c. Access to Secret or Confidential classified information may be permitted for eligible contractor employees by the VROC on a temporary basis, pending completion of the appropriate BI.
d. Access to TS classified information may be permitted for eligible contractor employees by the VROC on a temporary basis, pending completion of the appropriate BI. DON contracting commands in receipt of requests for interim TS access will validate the contract, the contractor’s need-to-know, and the necessity for the interim access.
e. COs will report to the VROC, via JPAS or successor system, any adverse or questionable information that comes to their attention concerning a cleared contractor employee assigned to a worksite under their control. An information copy of the report will also be forwarded to the Cognizant Security Office identified on the DD Form 254. COs will also report adverse or questionable information to the VROC or DoD CAF when a cleared contractor employee has SCI access, or is a consultant whose clearance eligibility has been established by the VROC or DoD CAF.
f. Commands are responsible for ensuring all clearance eligibility and access requirements are identified on the DD 254. Command procedures for granting or denying access to classified information for cleared contractor personnel are provided in paragraph 8-12.
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Enclosure (9) UNFAVORABLE ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
1. Overview
a. No individual will be given access to classified information or assigned to sensitive duties unless a favorable eligibility determination has been made regarding his/her loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness. A PSI is conducted, as detailed in Section 5, to gather information pertinent to these determinations.
b. The eligibility determination is the result of overall common sense "whole person" adjudication, reached by application of the evaluation criteria in reference (b). The criteria apply to all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, and other individuals who require access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
c. Eligibility determinations are restricted to U.S. citizens determined to require eligibility to execute official U.S. government functions and duties (including employees of contractors under the NISP). Eligibility will not be established for individuals pursuant to the “Bond Amendment” identified in reference (b).
d. The personnel security adjudicative process evaluates investigative and other related information. It does not determine criminal guilt or general suitability for a given position. It assesses past behavior as a basis for predicting the individual's future trustworthiness and potential fitness for a sensitive position that, if improperly executed, could impact national security.
e. The VROC and DoD CAF are the authorities for making favorable and unfavorable eligibility determinations. The employing command is responsible for making the basic employment suitability determinations and evaluating potential nexus issues using personnel suitability regulations, however, the VROC and the DoD CAF can make a determination that an employee is ineligible to occupy a sensitive national security position based on this policy manual.
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2 Enclosure (9) f. Commands are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the VROC and DoD CAF are apprised whenever credible derogatory information develops that suggests an individual may no longer be in compliance with personnel security standards. Commands will report the issues to the VROC or the DoD CAF for adjudication using JPAS or successor system within 72-hours and make a determination on whether the derogatory information warrants the suspension of access to classified information. (For SCI access, refer to reference (k) for reporting requirements.) Commands must implement a proactive continuous evaluation program as described in Section 11, per reference (b), to satisfy this requirement.
g. Regardless of an individual’s intent to appeal, once the VROC or the DoD CAF makes an unfavorable eligibility determination, the command must remove all accesses authorized and debrief the individual and remove civilian employees from designated sensitive positions in accordance with reference (b).
h. Unless there is a reasonable basis for doubting a person's loyalty to the U.S., decisions regarding appointment or retention in civilian employment or acceptance or retention in the Navy and Marine Corps are governed by personnel policies not under the purview of this enclosure.
i. DON civilian employees or military members shall not be removed from employment or separated from service due to failure to meet the requirements of this policy manual if removal or separation can be effected under OPM regulations or administrative (non-security) military regulations. However, administrative actions contemplated in this regard shall in no way affect or limit the responsibility of the DoD CAF to continue to adjudicate the issue for unfavorable security determination, as warranted and supported by the criteria and standards contained in this enclosure.
j. No separation under other than honorable conditions will be taken with respect to any Navy or Marine military member, nor will any action be taken to effect the separation, dismissal, discharge, or other involuntary separation for cause of any DON civilian employee or any contractor/consultant employee under the personnel security cognizance of the DON, in any case where the individual has held access to SCI and/or SAPs within 18
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3 Enclosure (9) months prior to the proposed action, unless approval is first received from the program manager (i.e. the DNI for SCI access or CNO (N9SP) for SAPs).
2. Authorities and Responsibilities
a. The authority to determine eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive national security positions is vested in the SECNAV. This authority and the associated responsibilities for unfavorable personnel security determinations are delegated as follows:
(1) The DUSN will:
(a) Issue DON PSP policy.
(b) Assign responsibilities for overall management of the PSI program.
(c) Ensure timely due process is afforded in appeals of unfavorable DoD CAF personnel security determinations.
(2) The President, PSAB will:
(a) Preside over the PSAB, a three-member panel appointed by the Director of Review Boards, which reviews and provides final decisions on appeals of unfavorable DoD CAF determinations. The PSAB decision is final and concludes the administrative appeals process.
(b) Ensure the PSAB meets at least monthly and provides notice of the PSAB to sustain or reverse determinations made by the DoD CAF within 5 days of determination.
(3) CO’s will:
(a) Administratively withdraw access when the requirement for access to classified information no longer exists. Debrief the individual in accordance with Section 4, and notify the DoD CAF, via JPAS or successor system, that security clearance eligibility is no longer required.
(b) Continuously evaluate command personnel with
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4 Enclosure (9) regard to their eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment to a sensitive position, applying the criteria outlined in reference (b). Forward all potentially disqualifying information to DoD CAF via JPAS or its successor. The DoD CAF will review the information and reevaluate the individual's clearance eligibility using reference (r).
(c) Ensure individuals are appropriately referred to command assistance programs, as issues dictate.
(d) Suspend an individual's access to classified information for cause when warranted, and notify the DoD CAF within 10 days. (Once access is suspended and reported to DoD CAF, it may not be reinstated unless approved by the DoD CAF.)
(e) Ensure command security officials acknowledge receipt and comply with instructions in correspondence (e.g., Letter of Intent (LOI), Letter of Denial (LOD), PSAB letters), related to unfavorable determinations, notify DoD CAF or PSAB immediately if command no longer has cognizance over the individual, and promptly respond as appropriate.
(f) Ensure security officials assist personnel who are undergoing the unfavorable determinations process, by explaining the personnel security eligibility determination process, providing the adjudication criteria used by DoD CAF, and providing guidance on obtaining pertinent information used in the DoD CAF proposed determinations.
(g) Ensure final DoD CAF unfavorable personnel security eligibility determinations are immediately coordinated with supervisors, human resource specialists, and security personnel so that necessary actions are quickly taken to officially remove personnel accordingly from access to classified information and assignment to sensitive duties.
(h) Deny visitor access or restrict admittance to command areas, as deemed appropriate, when disqualifying information regarding an individual from another command is revealed. Ensure the individual's parent command, agency, or facility is notified of your action, to include the basis for that action. For contractor employees, report disqualifying
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5 Enclosure (9) issues to both the Contractor's Facility Security Officer and to the VROC.
(4) The individual will:
(a) Be aware of the personnel security eligibility standards and continuing evaluation criteria, and to seek the advice of the local security officials whenever information develops that could affect eligibility.
(b) Provide thorough, accurate, and timely responses to requests for information from personnel security investigators, security officials, DoD CAF adjudicators, or PSAB representatives.
b. To be accurate and efficient, the unfavorable determination process relies on a full and frank exchange of pertinent information and timely action by all responsible parties; timely adjudicative action at DoD CAF, timely and thorough response from individual as facilitated by command security officials, and prompt appeal consideration at PSAB.
3. Restrictions on the Granting or Renewal of Security Clearances
a. Eligibility determinations are restricted to only U.S. citizens who are employees of the executive branch of the U.S. government (including employees of contractors under the NISP).
b. Eligibility will only be established for persons who are in a position that requires eligibility, based on evaluation of the appropriate completed PSI and in conformance with reference (b) adjudicative criteria. Exceptions to this restriction are rare.
c. The SECNAV may not renew security clearances, absent a waiver, grant or renew security clearances that provide access to SAPs, SCI, or RD in accordance with reference (k).
4. Unfavorable Determinations Process
a. Commands will forward credible derogatory information from any source including but not limited to, an incident
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6 Enclosure (9) report, continuous evaluation alert or a BI to the DoD CAF for determination of continued eligibility for security clearance, as appropriate. The DoD CAF will determine if the information is within the scope of the national security eligibility adjudicative guidelines, per reference (b). If a denial or revocation of national security eligibility is considered appropriate, the DoD CAF will issue to the individual concerned via JPAS or successor system a LOI and enclosed Statement of Reason (SOR) through the security manager to the individual to revoke or deny security clearance eligibility, SCI access, or sensitive position eligibility. The LOI and SOR will be as comprehensive and detailed as the protection of sources afforded confidentiality under the provisions of reference (u) and as national security permits and contain:
(1) A summary of the security concerns and supporting adverse information.
(2) Instructions for responding to the SOR.
(3) A copy of the relevant national security adjudicative guideline(s).
(4) A list and description of the information relied upon to render the proposed unfavorable national security eligibility determination.
(5) An explanation of each security concern, including the specific facts that triggered each security concern, the applicable adjudicative guideline(s) for each concern, and the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions for each adjudicative guideline cited.
b. The command will immediately present the LOI and SOR to the individual and assume a direct role in facilitating the process. The command will determine the individual's intent regarding a response in writing with an explanation, rebuttal, or mitigation for the derogatory information, and immediately complete and return the Acknowledgement of Receipt of the LOI via JPAS or successor system within 10 calendar days to the DoD CAF indicating whether the individual intends to submit a response to the contemplated action and whether the command has
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7 Enclosure (9) granted an extension of time to submit the response. The LOI advises the individual that if they choose not to respond, absence an approved extension, or if the response is untimely, they will forfeit their right to appeal.
c. The command will notify the DoD CAF within 10 calendar days if they are unable to deliver the LOI or SOR to the individual. The notification will include information as to why the LOI or SOR could not be delivered (e.g., illness or death in the family or deployment) and when it is expected the individual can receive a copy of the LOI and SOR. The ASM must deliver the LOI and SOR immediately upon the individual’s return.
d. Acknowledgement of receipt of the LOI through JPAS or successor system to the DoD CAF and indicate the individual's intentions.
e. If the individual is no longer affiliated with the command, the DoD CAF will be immediately notified and the LOI will be returned to the DoD CAF.
f. The command will review the information contained in the LOI and SOR to determine if it is in the best interest of national security to take interim action to suspend the individual's access to classified information or suspension of assignment to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination) should be suspended while the unfavorable determination process continues. Individuals with interim or temporary access will have their access removed immediately. An incident report will not be submitted on the same information that is included in the LOI and SOR. The Commander’s decision(s) on access will be documented, signed, and a copy maintained by the security manager until the final adjudication. If access is suspended:
(1) It will be formally suspended in JPAS or successor system. Informal suspension (removal of access) is not authorized when an LOI or SOR is issued.
(2) The individual will be debriefed from access to classified information.
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8 Enclosure (9) (3) The individual will sign a receipt, acknowledging receipt of the access suspension notification.
g. The ASM will serve as the liaison between the DoD CAF and the individual. The ASM will:
(1) Deliver the LOI and SOR and have the individual acknowledge receipt of the LOI and SOR. The ASM and a witness will document the delivery if the individual refuses acknowledgement.
(2) Obtain an acknowledgement receipt with the individual’s intention to respond within the time specified and submit the receipt to the DoD CAF in JPAS or successor system within 10 calendar days.
(3) Explain the consequences of the proposed action and the need to respond in a timely fashion.
(4) Explain how to request extensions.
(5) Explain how to obtain copies of investigative records.
(6) Explain the procedures for responding to the LOI and SOR.
(7) Explain the individual’s entitlement to obtain legal counsel or other assistance at their own expense within the relevant time periods.
h. When a security office receives a LOI and SOR, or a LOD and/or Letter of Revocation concerning an individual who is no longer assigned to the command, the LOI and SOR or the LOD or revocation will be returned to the DoD CAF with a statement indicating the individual’s status. If the individual has been discharged from military service with no reserve obligation, is incarcerated, or is dropped from the rolls as a deserter, return the LOI and SOR or the LOD or revocation and upload the discharge orders or supporting documentation to the DoD CAF via JPAS or successor system.
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9 Enclosure (9) i. The LOI or SOR response by the command and the individual:
(1) The commander and/or security manager will ensure that the individual acknowledges receipt of the LOI and SOR by signing and dating the response form enclosed in the LOI and SOR. The recipient of the LOI will indicate his or her intention of submitting a rebuttal or response to a LOI and SOR within 10 calendar days of receipt of the LOI and SOR. The receipt will be uploaded to the DoD CAF via JPAS or successor system and;
(a) Will not deny or revoke an individual’s national security eligibility without official documentation that the individual received the LOI and SOR. All LOIs and SORs will have a returned receipt submitted to the DoD CAF.
(b) If the individual refuses to sign the receipt, the refusal will be documented and signed by the commander or supervisor and returned to the DoD CAF.
(2) The individual’s reply to the LOI and SOR must be submitted no later than 30 calendar days from receipt of the LOI and SOR to prepare and submit a written response. No outside influence will be permitted to forfeit the individual's opportunity to reply. The commander has the authority to grant the recipient of the LOI up to 30 extension days (for a total of 60 days) for the preparation of a response, provided the DoD CAF is notified of the extension time granted. After the initial 30-day extension, requests for extensions must be directed to the DoD CAF with a valid justification.
(3) The commander and/or ASM will ensure that the individual is counseled as to the seriousness of the DoD CAF contemplated action and will offer advice and assistance needed in forming a reply. The person can obtain legal counsel or other assistance at his or her own expense, and may request a copy of the investigative files under the provisions of reference (u). If other than DON investigative records repository files exist, the Freedom of Information Act Office and/or Privacy Office will refer the request to the appropriate repository.
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10 Enclosure (9) (4) The individual's written response should address each issue raised in the LOI and SOR. Failing to address each issue may result in the DoD CAF rendering an unfavorable determination. Any pertinent written documentation must be labeled in a manner to ensure it is properly associated with the issue(s) raised in the LOI and/or SOR. Letters of recommendation from commanders and/or supervisory personnel must be attached to the response. The individual will forward the response through the ASM to the DoD CAF.
(5) If an individual decides not to respond to the LOI and SOR after initially indicating an intent to respond, the ASM will upload a signed document from the individual, documenting the decision not to respond, prior to the 30-day suspense.
(6) The DoD CAF final decision will be forwarded through the servicing ASM to the individual.
j. The command must respond within 10 calendar days after delivery of the LOI to the recipient by forwarding the completed Acknowledgement of Receipt of the LOI to the DoD CAF via JPAS or successor system. Absent command or individual notification of intentions, the DoD CAF may issue a final determination after 90 calendar days from the date on the LOI based upon existing information.
k. The DoD CAF will adjudicate the response to the LOI within 90 calendar days of receipt and will either make a favorable determination and authorize eligibility or issue a LOD of the unfavorable determination.
l. If a favorable determination is made, individuals will be notified in writing, via their command, and the decision recorded in JPAS or successor system.
m. If an unfavorable national security eligibility determination is received:
(1) The DoD CAF will provide a LOD or Letter to Revoke (LOR) in response to the individual’s written response to the LOI and SOR if the conditions presented were not favorably adjudicated. The LOD or LOR must provide the individual with a comprehensive and detailed written explanation of each security
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11 Enclosure (9) concern, the applicable adjudicative guideline(s) related to each concern, and an explanation of the types of mitigating information they could provide to support their appeal.
(2) The LOD or LOR will inform the individual of their right to appeal the DoD CAF unfavorable national security determination. The letter will inform the individual of their right to:
(a) Be represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense.
(b) Request the documents, records and reports upon which the unfavorable national security determination was made.
(3) The individual must acknowledge the receipt of the LOD or LOR and indicate in writing if they will submit an appeal within 10 calendar days. If the individual refuses to acknowledge receipt or indicate whether an appeal will be submitted, the refusal will be documented and signed by the commander or supervisor and returned to the DoD CAF.
(4) The ASM will notify the DoD CAF within 10 calendar days if they are unable to deliver the LOD or LOR to the individual. The notification will include information as to why the LOD or LOR could not be delivered (e.g., illness or death in the family, deployment) and when it is expected that the individual can receive a copy of the LOD. The ASM must deliver the LOD immediately upon the individual’s return.
(5) Upon receipt of an LOD or LOR, the ASM will debrief the individual from access to classified information.
5. Appeals Process
a. The PSAB is the final appellate authority for unfavorable personnel security determinations made by the DoD CAF. If an individual chooses to appeal an unfavorable DoD CAF determination, the appeal may be made by personal appearance or in writing as follows:
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12 Enclosure (9) (1) Individuals may request a personal appearance before an Administrative Judge (AJ) from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). This appearance is intended to provide the individual an opportunity to personally respond to the DoD CAF LOD, LOR and to submit supporting documentation to the AJ, who will make a recommendation to the PSAB. A transcript of the proceedings of the personal appearance along with any supplemental documentation will be forwarded with the DOHA AJ's recommendation and will serve as the individual's appeal to the PSAB.
(2) Individuals may submit a written appeal directly to the PSAB via their command and forego the personal appearance. A written appeal should also include supporting documentation, when appropriate.
b. Individuals may not choose both options. Having or not having a personal appearance will not bias the PSAB in making a fair determination.
c. DOHA Personal Appearances
(1) Individuals desiring to present a personal appeal must request a DOHA hearing within 10 days of receipt of the LOD or LOR.
(2) The DOHA will normally schedule the personal appearance to be accomplished within 30 days of receipt of the individual's request.
(3) Individuals will be provided a notice designating time, date, and place for the personal appearance. For individuals at duty stations within the contiguous 48 states, the personal appearance will be conducted at the individual's duty station, a nearby suitable location, or by video- teleconference. For individuals assigned to duty stations outside the contiguous 48 states, the site of the personal appearance will be determined by the Director, DOHA or designee at (1) the individual's duty station; (2) a suitable location near the individual's duty station; or (3) at DOHA facilities located either in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area or the Los Angeles, California metropolitan area.
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13 Enclosure (9) (4) Travel costs for the individual presenting a personal appeal to the DOHA will be the responsibility of the individual's command.
(5) The individual may be represented by counsel or other personal representative at the individual's expense.
(6) Requests for postponement of the personal appearance can be granted only for good cause as determined by the DOHA AJ.
(7) Individuals who choose a personal appearance will have the opportunity to present, cross-examine witnesses, or obtain comments in writing for submission to the AJ at the proceeding. Individuals who desire to present the view of others must do so in writing (e.g., letters of reference, letters from medical authorities, etc.). The appeal should address the disqualifying issues identified by the LOD or LOR and should present any existing mitigation as defined in reference (b), to include pertinent supporting documentation.
(8) The AJ will review the individual's case file, hear the individual's or counsel's or personal representative's presentation, and review any documentation submitted by the individual. Then the AJ will develop a recommended determination that will be forwarded along with a transcript of the personal appeal to the PSAB generally within 30 days of the personal appearance.
(9) The value of a command perspective on the PSAB deliberations cannot be overstated. Since appeals presented to DOHA do not have the benefit of a command endorsement, commands are strongly encouraged to submit a position paper directly to the PSAB. However, due to time constraints, the PSAB will only solicit a command position when the DOHA personal appearance presents substantial information not included in the individual's rebuttal to the LOD or LOR. When this happens, a PSAB representative will contact the command to request the new information. The command will have 10 days to respond and will afford the individual the opportunity to review the information prior to submission to the PSAB.
d. PSAB Written Appeal Submissions
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14 Enclosure (9) (1) Within 10 calendar days of receipt of the LOD or LOR, the individual will sign and return the notice of intent to appeal to the adjudication facility via their security office. The individual has 30 days from receipt of the LOD or LOR to submit a written appeal to the PSAB. The PSAB President or designee may grant a 30 calendar day extension of time for good cause demonstrated by the appellants (e.g., illness, death in the family or deployment).
(2) The written appeal may be made by counsel or personal representative at the individual's expense.
(3) Written appeals should address the disqualifying issues identified by the LOD or LOR, and should present any existing mitigation as defined in reference (b), to include pertinent supporting documentation.
(4) Commands will provide a command perspective by submitting an endorsement to the individual's written appeal and will afford the individual the opportunity to review the written endorsement prior to the final submission to the PSAB.
e. PSAB Procedures
(1) The PSAB will review the DoD CAF case file, the individual's appeal (to include DOHA recommendations and command submissions as provided), and any supporting documentation submitted by the individual.
(2) If the PSAB agrees with the DOHA recommendation, the PSAB may adopt the DOHA recommendation in lieu of providing a PSAB written determination.
(3) The PSAB normally renders decisions within 45 days of receipt of the individual's appeal from the DoD CAF or 30 days from receipt of the DOHA recommendation.
(4) The PSAB may also request additional information or determine that information not contained in the adjudicative record or the appeal material is needed to render a final determination (e.g., updated credit bureau report, information from the command) the new information must be provided to the individual. The individual must be provided a reasonable period
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15 Enclosure (9) of time to offer any rebuttal to this information, prior to it being considered by the PSAB.
(5) Personal appearances before the PSAB are prohibited; however the PSAB may request additional information from the appellant through the command.
(6) The PSAB will meet at least monthly, and within 10 days of the Board decision, will upload the decisions via JPAS or successor system, and notify the individual, via the individual's command, of the PSAB determination.
f. The PSAB determination is final and concludes the administrative appeals process.
(1) The PSAB will direct the DoD CAF to grant or restore eligibility when the PSAB finds for the appellant. The PSAB’s written decision will identify each adjudicative guideline issue stated in the LOD or LOR that formed the basis of the denial or revocation that remains unmitigated after the appeal and the rationale for the final disposition of the appeal. The DoD CAF will adjust the JPAS or successor system record to re-establish eligibility within two days of receipt of the PSAB determination letter.
(2) When the PSAB finds against the appellant, reconsideration is only possible, if at a later date (at least one year from the date of the final PSAB denial or revocation decision) the individual's command determines that a valid requirement for access to classified information exists and the issues which caused the unfavorable determination seem to have been mitigated either through the passage of time or other relevant positive developments. Paragraph 7-6 explains the reconsideration process. A copy of the PSAB determination letter will be provided to the DoD CAF for inclusion in the adjudicative record.
6. Reestablishing Eligibility After A Denial or Revocation. Following an unfavorable security determination, a request to reestablish eligibility normally a minimum of 12 months after the concluding unfavorable determination either by PSAB if appeal rights were exercised or by the DoD CAF if appeal rights were NOT exercised, and;
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16 Enclosure (9) a. A commander may request reconsideration of unfavorable national security determinations for individuals within their command one year after the denial or revocation. The year is counted from the date of the denial or revocation decision by the DoD CAF; or, if the individual elected to appeal, one year from the date of the PSAB determination.
b. Individuals who terminate their affiliation with the federal government (including federal contract employment) for 24 months or more after an unfavorable national security determination are not subject to the reconsideration process. When attempting to re-affiliate with the DON these individuals will be submitted for a new BI.
c. Reconsideration will not be requested solely based on an individual’s personal desire to acquire eligibility. Reconsideration is not a personal right or entitlement. The individual must be in a position or have a duty assignment that requires national security eligibility.
d. If a denial or revocation is based on significant derogatory information that has been reported to a CI or law enforcement authority, the DoD CAF should consult with these authorities to ensure it has all relevant information before reviewing a reconsideration request.
e. The following should be met before a request for reconsideration is submitted:
(1) The individual's commander must determine that the issues which caused the unfavorable determination are mitigated as outlined in reference (b), either through the passage of time or other relevant positive developments.
(2) The command has a current mission critical requirement, including tentative selection to a federal position, for the individual to have access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position.
(3) Reconsideration requests are formally submitted from the commander or designee of the employing activity to the DoD CAF. Reconsideration requests must be fully detailed and justified, providing all relevant documentation that the
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17 Enclosure (9) circumstances or conditions that resulted in the final adverse eligibility determination have been rectified or sufficiently mitigated to warrant reconsideration. The documentation required depends on the reason(s) for the denial or revocation, such as, a current evaluation for behavioral (psychological) health issues, an evaluation for drug or alcohol abuse, or current financial statements.
(4) Individuals whose current eligibility is either denied or revoked or who are pending reconsideration are not authorized temporary/interim access and/or temporary assignment to national security or sensitive positions.
(5) Any request for reconsideration submitted to the DoD CAF in accordance with the above provisions must outline the reasons for the denial or revocation and provide a rationale for favorable action. The request for reconsideration must be endorsed by the individual's commander or delegated representative. Commanders may delegate this responsibility to managers who are responsible for the supervision of the individual. The commander should be familiar with the information available to the decision authority and with the DoD CAF and/or PSAB’s rationale for denying the appeal. If the individual does not have a copy of the DoD CAF or PSAB’s original decision, as applicable, the commander should request a copy of the record.
(6) Once security offices submit their DoD Components request for re-consideration, no supplemental information will be accepted or considered unless requested by the DoD CAF. Should the DoD CAF request additional information, the Command must submit the documentation within the given timeframes.
f. The DoD CAF has the authority to grant or deny the reconsideration based on a review of the submitted documentation to determine the extent to which circumstances or conditions have been rectified or sufficiently mitigated.
(1) DoD CAF will assess the request and reestablish eligibility, if warranted.
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18 Enclosure (9) (2) If a favorable determination is not possible, the DoD CAF will provide notification through the command to the DoD Component in writing, generally within 30 days from receipt of request for reconsideration.
(3) The individual will not be eligible for reconsideration for at least one year from the DoD CAF reconsideration decision.
(4) No due process is afforded for denial of a request for reconsideration.
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Enclosure (10) ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
1. Overview
a. The CO’s responsibility for his or her command is absolute. The authority of the CO is commensurate with his or her responsibility. COs have ultimate responsibility and authority for all determinations regarding persons who may have access to classified information under their control.
b. COs will determine those position functions under their control that require access to classified information, and may authorize access to the incumbents of such positions who have officially been determined to be eligible by the appropriate adjudicative authority.
c. COs may grant access to classified information to any individual who has an official need-to-know, established security clearance eligibility, and about whom there is no known un-adjudicated disqualifying information.
d. No one has a right to have access to classified information solely because of rank, position, or security clearance eligibility.
e. Access to classified information will be granted only if allowing access will promote the furtherance of the DON mission while preserving the interests of national security.
f. Access to classified information will be limited to the extent possible, to the minimum number of persons necessary to accomplish the mission, and will be based on need-to-know. Additionally, the level of the classification and the amount of information authorized for access will be limited to the minimum level and amount required to perform assigned duties.
g. Access to classified information will be formally terminated when it is no longer required in the performance of assigned DON duties and/or when the individual's security clearance eligibility is denied or revoked.
h. All individuals will complete a SF 312 prior to being granted initial access to classified information and recorded in JPAS or successor system.